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CASENOTES

TITLE VII: MISAPPLICATION OF THE BUSINESS NECESSITY DEFENSE-UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir.
1989).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, employers have implemented fetal protection policies, in part to protect the health of the unborn children of pregnant
employees and in part to protect themselves from tort actions brought
on behalf of children born with physical or developmental disabilities
traceable to the exposure of the mother to workplace health hazards.'
The typical fetal protection policy prevents pregnant women from
working in jobs which would expose them to chemicals or other toxic
substances or processes which might harm their unborn children.'
Some policies apply only to women who are known to be pregnant.3
Others apply to all fertile women, typically those aged fifty-five and
under.'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) prohibits an
employer from basing any employment decision on an employee's sex,5
or on pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions. 6 The purpose
served by the statute, to ensure equal employment opportunities for all
citizens, 7 thus conflicts with the employer's interest in limiting tort liability and society's interest in protecting the healthy development of
unborn children.
In 1989, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided UAW v.
Johnson Controls, Inc.8 In its complaint, the union alleged that the
1. See Fletcher, Sex Discrimination OK to Protect Fetus, Bus. INs., Oct. 16, 1989, at 78.
2. See, e.g., Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Occupational Safety and Health
Review Comm'n, 671 F.2d 643, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
3. See, e.g., Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 988 (5th Cir. 1982).
4. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. American Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d
444, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The American Cyanamid policy deems any woman between the ages
of "16 and 50 to be of childbearing capacity unless she has been surgically sterilized. Id. at 446.
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
7. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 288 (1987) (citing Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)).
8. 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (interim ed. 1990).
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9
employer's fetal protection policy violated Title VII. The employer
moved for summary judgment which motion was granted by the district court.10 Even though one dissenting judge called Johnson Controls
likely the "most important sex-discrimination case in any court since
1964 ' 11 the Seventh Circuit, after a rehearing en banc, affirmed the
district court's grant.
The most important question of law arising from Johnson Controls
is whether the business necessity defense, traditionally reserved for Title VII cases involving disparate impact, is applicable to an employer
policy that is on its face non-neutral. The Seventh Circuit in Johnson
Controls, building upon the reasoning of two earlier cases" involving
fetal protection policies, held as a matter of law that the business necessity defense is available to an employer who establishes a fetal protection policy applicable only to women. It is the assertion of this casenote that the business necessity defense should not apply to a case of disparate treatment under Title VII
involving a fetal protection policy targeted solely to women. Further,
the appropriate defense, bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ),
when applied to the record before the court, does not support a grant of
summary judgement under the analytical framework set forth in Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell. 3 The BFOQ defense fails when applied
to that prong of the policy affecting pregnant women. The defense fails
also when applied to that prong of the policy affecting fertile women.
The female employee's rights under Title VII should not be set aside
because she is capable of conceiving a child. The Supreme Court has
not interpreted Title VII to implicate the interests of non-consumer
third parties and unborn children of employees are sufficiently dissimilar to customers and clients to discourage extension of Title VII doctrine to them. The interests of unborn children of both male and female
employees are adequately protected by Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) regulations. Last, employers without fetal
protection policies do not need protection from tort liability. The employer may not have a duty to a fetus injured when non-viable, an employer who adheres to OSHA regulations governing lead is not likely to
breach any duty that might be imposed, and even if the employer is
found to be negligent, costs of judgment are unlikely to be borne by the
employer alone.

9.

Id. at 874.

10. id.
11. Id. at 920 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
12. Id. See Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v.
Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
13. 472 U.S. 400 (1985).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol15/iss2/5

1990]

TITLE VII BUSINESS NECESSITY DEFENSE

II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

In UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.," plaintiffs International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America (hereinafter "UAW"), several UAW-affiliated local unions, and a group of individual employees brought suit alleging
that the fetal protection policy of Johnson Controls violated Title VII.'
The case came before the Seventh Circuit upon plaintiffs' appeal of the
district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant Johnson
Controls. 6
The controversy surrounding Johnson Controls' fetal protection
policy grew out of the operation of its battery division. 17 An essential
material in the manufacture of batteries is lead, which is known to be
an occupational hazard.1 8 Globe Union, Johnson Controls' predecessor,
had "initiated a large number of innovative programs in an attempt to
control and regulate industrial lead exposure."' 9 The first fetal protection policy was implemented in 1977,20 a year before OSHA announced
its revised standard for occupational exposure to lead." The original
policy did not prohibit women capable of bearing children from working in lead handling jobs, but instead advised women that lead exposure creates a risk of unknown dimensions to the unborn. 2 Globe advised women who were considering a family to consult with the family
doctor and notify the company of any wish to transfer." Globe manag-

14. 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (interim ed. 1990).
15. Id. at 874.
16. Id. at 874. Originally, the case was argued before a panel of the court which, prior to
publication of its opinion, circulated the opinion among all members of the court pursuant to
circuit rule. A majority of the members voted to hear the case before an en banc court. Id. at 87475.
17. The battery division was created when Johnson Controls purchased Globe Union, Inc. in
1978. Id. at 875.
18. See Occupational Exposure to Lead: Attachments to Preamble for the Final Standard,
43 Fed. Reg. 54,354-509. (1978). ("The basis for this revised lead standard is evidence of the
toxic effects of lead on the heme, renal, neurological, and reproductive systems at relatively low
levels of exposure to lead."); see also Final Standard for Occupational Exposure to Lead, Supplementary Information, 43 Fed. Reg. 52,952-53,025 (1978). ("The record demonstrates that lead
has profoundly adverse effects on the health of workers in the lead industr).")
19. 886 F.2d at 875. Efforts included lead hygiene, respirators, biological monitoring and
medical surveillance programs; regulation of the type, use, and disposal of employee work clothing
and footwear; transferring employees with high blood lead levels out of high lead environments
with corresponding medical removal benefits; and the use of pumps, sweepers and scrubbers
designed to keep the work area as free of lead dust as possible. Id.
20. Id. at 875-76.
21. See supra note 18.
22. 886 F.2d at 876.
23. Id. It is not clear whether a woman so transferred would receive any removal benefits or
whether she would retain her former rate of pay. In addition, the number of women choosing to
transfer is unknown.
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ers were also instructed to ask any woman considering pregnancy to
sign a statement indicating she had been advised of the risk. 4
The fetal protection policy giving rise to the Johnson Controls,liti-

gation was adopted in 1982.25 "The policy recite[d] that women with
childbearing capacity will neither be hired for nor allowed to transfer

into those jobs in which lead levels are defined as excessive." 26 The

policy applied to all women except those whose infertility was medically documented. 2 7 A grandmother clause in the policy permitted fer-

tile women currently in high lead exposure positions to retain these jobs
so long as they were able to maintain blood lead levels below 30 micrograms per 100 grams of whole blood.28 Employees who were removed
from positions as a result of elevated blood lead levels were "trans-

ferred to another job in Johnson's employ without suffering either a loss
of pay or benefits." 29

The given reason for the adoption of the revised fetal protection
policy was the ineffectiveness, of the former, voluntary policy in protect-

ing pregnant women and their unborn children from "dangerous blood
lead levels." 3 0 Johnson Controls emphasized its continuing interest in
protecting employees and their families from occupational health

hazards."1
Johnson Controls had considered and rejected several alternatives
to excluding fertile women from high lead exposure positions prior to

implementing its revised policy.32 It concluded that its voluntary program was ineffective and rejected its continuation. The manufacture
of batteries without lead was presumably infeasible.

4

The technology

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. Men were not affected by the policy. Id.
28. Id. This measure was lower than the 50 ,dl level permitted under OSHA lead exposure
regulations. See Occupational Safety & Health Standards: Lead, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(c)(1)
(1990).
29. 886 F.2d at 876. Medical removal with full benefits is required by OSHA. See 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1025(k)(2) (1989).
30. 886 F.2d at 876. In the four years between 1979 and 1983, six Johnson Controls employees in high lead exposure positions became pregnant while maintaining blood lead levels in
excess of 30 micrograms. Id. at 876-77. One of the children born to this group of employees had
an elevated blood lead level. Id. at 877. There was no evidence that the blood lead levels of
children born to all Johnson Controls employees, men and women, were monitored by the employer. Id.
31. id.
32. Id. at 878.
33. Id. The only evidence of birth defects appeared to be anecdotal testimony of hyperactivity in one child with an elevated blood lead level. This child was born to a mother working in the
Owosso, Michigan plant. Id. at 877.
34. Id. at 878. It is unknown whether the record before the district court contained testimony on this issue.
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to further reduce lead exposure of employees was not developed.35 Application of the policy only to women who actually were pregnant was
ruled out for two reasons. First, it was thought that exposure to lead
could damage the fetus before the mother discovered she was pregnant. 6 Second, Johnson Controls asserted that even if the mother discovered her pregnancy immediately and was thereupon removed from a
high lead exposure job, the fetus would continue to be exposed to lead
because lead in the blood does not dissipate immediately." Limiting
the policy to women who were planning pregnancies was rejected because of the frequency of unplanned pregnancies. 8
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by ,concluding that the record very clearly established that lead poses a substantial health risk to
the offspring of employees of Johnson Controls. 9 Having so satisfied
itself of a danger of permanent harm to the potential offspring of female employees, the court next turned to the question of the appropriate analytical framework for judging the propriety of the fetal protection policy of Johnson Controls. Inherent in its analysis was a
recognition of the interests of three parties-employer, employee, and
unborn child. 0
The Seventh Circuit, in determining whether the district court appropriately granted summary judgment in favor of Johnson Controls,
looked to decisions of the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits involving fetal
protection policies. The Johnson Controls court noted that the first
court of appeals to address the permissibility of a fetal protection policy
was the Fourth Circuit in Wright v. Olin Corp."' There, in a "case
involv[ing] a fetal protection program very similar to the one Johnson
instituted,' 42 the court applied the disparate impact-business necessity
defense that is normally utilized only where the employer's policy is
facially non-discriminatory but has a discriminatory effect. 43 In addi-

35. Id.
36. Id. Other experts take a contrary view and conclude that lead does not cross the placenta until late in pregnancy when the mother is certain to know she is pregnant. See Johnson
Controls, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 218 Cal. App. 3d 517, 538-39, 267 Cal.
Rptr. 158, 169 (1990).
37. 886 F.2d at 878.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 879-83. The court noted that "both the UAW and Johnson Controls agree on
appeal that a substantial health hazard to the unborn child in the womb has been established."
Id. at 879.
40. Id. at 886. ("We are convinced that the components of the business necessity defense
. . . balance the interests of the employer, the employee-and the unborn child in a manner consistent with Title VII.")
41. 679 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
42. 886 F.2d at 883.
43. Id. at 884.
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tion, the Johnson Controls court noted that the Eleventh Circuit in

Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital" had taken a similar approach in
applying the business necessity defense analytical framework."5
The Johnson Controls court cited as persuasive on the issue of the

appropriate analytical framework the 1988 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) policy statement on fetal hazards under
Title VII.46 While the EEOC's policy followed from and was admittedly an elaboration of the framework set forth by Olin and Hayes,4
the Johnson Controls court viewed the policy as support for the propri-

ety of utilizing the business necessity defense,48 concluding, "we agree
with the Fourth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit and the EEOC in their
necessity defense may be utilized in a fetal
conclusion that a business
' 49

protection policy case.
The court in Johnson Controls also adopted the elements of the
business necessity defense set forth by Olin and Hayes: (1) a demonstration of the existence of a substantial health risk to the unborn child,

and (2) establishment that transmission of the hazard to the unborn
child occurs only through women. 0 The Johnson Controls court also
recognized that the employer's defense of business necessity could be
rebutted by a showing by employees that "less discriminatory alternatives equally capable of preventing the health hazard to the unborn" 1
were available to the employer.
The ultimate question before the Johnson Controls court was

44. 726 F.2d 1543 (1lth Cir. 1984).
45. 886 F.2d at 884-85.
46. Id. at 885; see EEOC: Policy Statement on Reproductive and Fetal Hazards Under
Title VII, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 405:6613-19 (Oct. 3, 1988) [hereinafter EEOC Policy
Statement].
This policy
47. "Three courts of appeals have considered cases involving fetal hazards ....
statement is an elaboration of that framework which is intended to assist the agency in processing
its fetal hazard charges." Id. at :6013 n.l.
48. The court says, "[a] fair reading of the EEOC's Policy Statement reflects that the
EEOC thoroughly considered the various interests under Title VII and followed earlier judicial
decisions only after concluding that these decisions properly implemented Title VII policies." 886
F.2d at 885.
49. Id. at 886. Support from the EEOC was to be short-lived. On January 24, 1990, the
EEOC issued a policy guide on Johnson Controls wherein it was stated that the Commission
never meant to suggest that a fetal protection policy fits within the category of an adverse impact
case. See EEOC: Policy'Guide on United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 405:6797, :6800 (Jan. 24, 1990) [hereinafter EEOC Policy Guide]. The Commission concluded that BFOQ "is the better approach" and endorsed the position taken by the dissenters in
Johnson Controls. Id. The EEOC Policy Guide made the Commission's position clear: fetal protection policies that exclude only one sex from particular jobs are facially discriminatory. Id. at
:6804.
50. 886 F.2d at 885.
51. Id.
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"whether the UAW, which bears the burden of persuasion,52 ha[d]
presented evidence sufficient to permit the district court to conclude
that Johnson Controls' business necessity defense cannot be factually
supported." 53 The question in effect consisted of two sub-questions. The
first was whether the UAW would be able to establish either that exposure of the mother to lead did not present a substantial risk of harm to
the unborn child5 4 or that the risk of transmission of potentially harmful lead exposure was not substantially confined to fertile female employees.55 The second sub-question was whether the union could establish that there were " 'acceptable alternative policies or practices which
would better accomplish the business purpose . . . [of protecting
against the risk of harm], or accomplish [it] equally well with a lesser
differential . . . impact [between women and men workers].' ",5 The
court concluded that the UAW had failed to create a record that would
allow the district court to conclude that there was a substantive issue of
material fact as to the risk of harm to the fetus 57 or that exposure to
the risk occurred only through a single sex. 58 The court emphasized
that both the UAW and Johnson Controls agreed that a substantial
risk of harm to the fetus had been established. 59 Further, the court
characterized the UAW's evidence on the risk to the fetus arising from
the father's exposure to lead as "at best, speculative and unconvincing." 60 The court concluded that the sex-based distinction was "based
upon real physical differences between men and women relating to
childbearing capacity and is consistent with Title VII." 1
Recognizing that, in theory, the UAW could still prevail if it could
demonstrate adequate but less discriminatory alternatives to the fetal
protection policy, the court noted that the union in its appellate brief
failed to "specifically articulate a less discriminatory alternative argument" and thus had failed to preserve that issue for appeal."' The court
in dicta, however, concluded that even if the union had preserved the
issue, "we would be constrained to hold that the UAW failed to present

52. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2125 (interim ed. 1989), the
Supreme Court made it clear that the burden of persuasion does not shift to the defendant once
the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of disparate impact.
53. 886 F.2d at 888.
54. Id. at 888.
55. Id. at 889.
56. Id. at 891 (quoting Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1191 (4th Cir. 1982)).
57. Id. at 888-89.
58. Id. at 889-90.
59. Id. at 888.
60. Id. at 889. The heart of the plaintiffs' case was that the risk of transmission is not
confined only to female employees. Id.
61. Id. at 890.
62. Id. at 891.
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facts sufficient for a trier of fact to conclude that less discriminatory
alternatives would equally effectively achieve an employer's legitimate

purpose in protecting unborn children. ..."" The court
noted that the
4
alternative.
specific
one
even
present
to
UAW failed
After adopting business necessity as the appropriate analytical
framework and holding that the union had failed to demonstrate that
there were issues of fact as to the substantial risk of harm and transmission of the risk only by women," the court went on to conclude that
even under a BFOQ defense,6" Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy
could be upheld.67
The majority opinion evoked dissents from Judges Cudahy, Posner

and Easterbrook, 68 all of whom asserted that the fetal protection policy
resulted in disparate treatment which might be justified if at all as a
BFOQ. The dissenters differed, however, in the conclusions that they
drew from the application of the BFOQ defense to the employer's fetal
protection policy.
Judge Cudahy asserted that it may be difficult for the employer to

establish a BFOQ but the employer should be afforded an opportunity
to try. He also suggested that the "painful complexities [of this important sex-discrimination case] are manifestly unsuited for summary
judgment."' '
Judge Posner in his dissent also asserted that the case cannot be
decided on so meager a record°7 0 and catalogued a series of questions

unanswered in the record before the court. 71 While it is clear that

63. Id.
64. Id. at 892.
65. For a contrary result involving a Johnson Controls battery plant in California, see Johnson Controls, Inc. v. California Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 218 Cal. App. 3d 517, 536
n.3, 267 Cal. Rptr. 158, 168 n.3 (1990) (men require similar protection from reproductive harm
arising from exposure to lead; Seventh Circuit simply ignored evidence relied upon by OSHA).
66. This statutory defense is set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1982) which provides:
"it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees
• . .on the basis of his . . . sex . . . where . . . sex . . . is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise."
67. 886 F.2d at 893.
68. Judge Flaum joined in the Easterbrook dissent. Id. at 908.
69. Id. at 902.
70. Id. Judge Posner expressed his concern that affirmance on so scanty a record would
encourage "incautious employers to adopt fetal protection policies that could endanger the jobs of
millions of women for minor gains in fetal safety and health." Id. at 908.
71. In particular, Judge Posner was troubled by the omission of information concerning the
feasibility of warnings as a substitute for the exclusionary policy, the policies of Johnson Controls'
competitors, the potential hazard to the fetus through paternal exposure to airborne lead, wages
and alternative employment opportunities of women employed in the battery division, and the
profitability of the battery manufacturing business. Id. at 906-07. The latter would shed light on
the vulnerability of the employer with respect to litigation arising from injury to the fetus. Id. at
907.
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Judge Posner viewed BFOQ as a narrow defense, at the same time he
asserted that "the 'normal operation' of a business encompasses ethical,
legal, and business concerns about the effects of an employer's activities
on third parties. '7 2 Under certain conditions, which in-the aggregate
are a question of fact 7 a fetal protection policy may be lawful.7 4 Judge

Posner concluded that "Title VII even as amended by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act does not outlaw all fetal protection policies, ' 75 but
Johnson Controls' policy is excessively cautious.7
In contrast to the Posner dissent, Judge Easterbrook, who agreed
with Posner that only the BFOQ defense is applicable to this case of
disparate treatment,7 also agreed with the Fourth Circuit that "as a
matter of law, a fetal protection policy does not satisfy the standards
for a BFOQ. . . .,,7 He argued that concern for the welfare of the
next generation is unrelated to the ability of Johnson Controls' to make
batteries or to the ability or inability of any woman to do the work to
which she is assigned.7 9 Further, he stated unequivocally that Johnson
Controls has neither the right nor the mandate under Title VII to assume that women are less able than men. of making "intelligent decisions about the welfare of the next generation, that the interests of the
next generation always trump the interests of the living woman, and
that the only acceptable level of risk is zero."80
The Easterbrook dissent, in which Judge Flaum joined, also opined
that even if the majority had adopted the appropriate analytical framework, 81 the material disputes in the record before the district court pre-

72. Id.at 904. Judge Posner asserted that employer concern over tort liability is an approximation of the social cost incurred by children who suffer prenatal injury from airborne lead absorbed into their mothers' bloodstreams and that Title VII does not require a company to ignore
that social cost. Id. at 905.
73. Id. at 906. Judge Posner asserted that if the hazard to the fetus from lead is sufficiently
great, if lead absorption cannot be reduced without discontinuing production, and if women continue to become pregnant even after being warned of the hazards, "nothing in the text of the
statute, or in its history or purpose, . . . prevent[s] an employer from defending his refusal to
allow fertile women to work in jobs in which they are exposed to dangerous concentrations of
airborne lead." Id.
74. Id. at 908.
75. Id. at 906.
76. Id. at 907 (The policy presumes that any woman under age 70 is fertile and also excludes women from non-lead handling jobs from which they might be promoted into battery
making.).
77. Id. at 911.
78. Id. at 912.
79. Id. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act states that: "women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes . . .as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work
.... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982) (emphasis added) [hereinafter PDA].
80. 886 F.2d at 913.
81. Judge Easterbrook emphasized that differences between sexes are the stated rationale of
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On the issue of substanti-

ality of risk to the fetus, Judge Easterbrook noted that "OSHA
considered and rejected a proposal to exclude women capable of bear-

ing children from jobs in which blood lead levels may exceed 30 mg/
1OOg"; 88 for the court to approve a policy that implements a restriction
rejected by OSHA is the counterpart of taking judicial notice that
OSHA is wrong. 4 On the transmission of risk by women only, the
Judge criticized the majority for overlooking in the record considerable

evidence sufficient to warrant a trial linking lead with injury to the
male reproductive system.8 5 On less restrictive alternatives, the Judge
indicated that "'zero' is not the only acceptable level"' 86 of risk. Judge
Easterbrook concluded that no "legal or ethical principle compels or

allows Johnson" 87 to make decisions based upon concern for the next
generation 88 or the prospect of tort judgments.8 9
III. BACKGROUND
A.

Title VII: Causes of Action and Defenses

The decision in U.A. W. v. Johnson Controls, Inc. is the third in a
trilogy of 'cases under section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 196490 addressing the issue of permissibility of an employer fetal
the policy and necessitate defense under BFOQ. Id. at 909, 911.
82. Id. at 915.
83. Id. at 917. Judge Easterbrook quoted from the text of hearings conducted prior to the
promulgation of the lead standard:
"OSHA believes there is no basis whatsoever for the claim that women of childbearing age
should be excluded from the workplace in order to protect the fetus or the course of pregnancy. Effective compliance with all aspects of these standard[s] will minimize risk to all
persons and should therefore insure equal employment for both men and women."
Id. (quoting 43 Fed. Reg. 52,953, 52,966 (1978)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 919. A list of amici curiae, viewing the evidence differently from the majority,
was given in the opinion. Id. at 920 n.17.
86. Id. at 919.
87. Id. at 913 (emphasis added).
88. Id. Ironically, removing women from well-paying jobs may reduce the quality of prenatal care and nutrition and thus be more injurious to the unborn child than lead exposure. Id. at
918.
89. Id. at 914. Judge Easterbrook stated that the "prospect of tort judgments means only
that female employees' average cost to Johnson exceeds that of male employees." Id. The Court in
Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), held that employer
decision-making based on cost differences between sex groupings violates Title VII because employees are treated as a group (women) rather than individuals.
90. The federal statute is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000e (1982). Section 2000e-2(a)
provides:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol15/iss2/5
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protection policy.9 1 "In passing Title VII, Congress made the simple
but momentous announcement that sex, race, religion, and national origin are not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or compensation of employees." 9 The intent of Congress was to forbid employers from taking
specific employee characteristics into account when making employment decisions.9 8 That gender is an impermissible decision-making criterion "appears on the face of the statute."' 9 The Supreme Court has
announced that the language of the statute means that "gender must
be irrelevant to employment decisions." 9 5
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 197898 amended Title VII
by adding, to the definitional section, 701(k) which prohibits discrimination "because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions. ' 97 The Act effectively overturned the holding of
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert 8 where the Supreme Court had held
that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disability benefits from the
General Electric's otherwise comprehensive employee disability plan
did not violate Title VII.9 9 The Court made clear in Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC 0 0° that "discrimination based
on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her
101
sex."
Title VII actions ordinarily are of one of two types. A claim of
disparate treatment arises when an employer "treats some people less

employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
91. The two other cases were: Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir.
1984); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
92. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1784 (interim ed. 1989).
93. Id. at 1785.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Pub. L. No. 95-555 § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
97. 42 U.S.C.. § 2000e(k). The statute in part provides:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the
same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit
programs as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work,
and nothing in 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.
98. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The passage of the PDA was said to have "unambiguously expressed [Congress'] disapproval of both the holding and the reasoning of the Court in the Gilbert
decision." Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 (1983).
99. 429 U.S. at 145-46.
100. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
101. Id. at 684.
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favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' 10 2 Proof of discriminatory motive is required' but employer intent may be established by inference.'"" Claims of disparate
impact involve "employment practices that are facially neutral in their
treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one
group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity." '1 5
Proof of discriminatory motive is not required under a theory of disparate impact.106 "The question, rather, is whether an employment practice has a significant, adverse effect on an identifiable class of workers-regardless of the cause or motive for the practice.'

0 07

Statistical

proof alone can make out a prima facie case of employment discrimination under disparate impact theory.' 08
1. BFOQ Defense
Each of the separate theories of discrimination under Title
VII-treatment and impact-traditionally have given rise to a unique
defense. The traditional defense under disparate treatment is the statutory defense of bona fide occupational qualification.' 0 9 Any employer
practice which treats an employee differently based upon the employee's membership in a protected class "must be shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job performance to survive a Title VII challenge." 10 The Supreme Court has stated that the BFOQ exception was
intended to be an "extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex.""'
There are two reasonably well-defined branches of the BFOQ de102. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
103. Id.
104. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2131 (interim ed. 1989) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). The framework for establishing the inference is set forth in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981).
105. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.15.
106. Id.
107. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2131 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "The [Civil Rights] Act
proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory
in operation." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). The absence of bad faith on
the part of the employer does not preclude action under Title VII. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975).
108. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 439.
109. The defense is set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e):
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter . . . it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of
his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise ..- .. "
110. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 n.14 (1977).
111. Id. at 334.
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fense. The first, ability to perform, is based on the premise that a wo-

man, for example, under some circumstances is unable to perform the
responsibilities or tasks of the job for which she is hired. In Dothard v.
Rawlinson, the Supreme Court found that because of the uniquely
deplorable conditions that existed in Alabama's penitentiaries 12 at the
time Ms. Rawlinson brought suit, a woman's ability to maintain order
could be affected by the fact that she was female. 113 As a result, the

Court held that being male was a bona fide occupational qualification
for the job1" of correctional counselor11 at that specific prison and
that the employer's policy of hiring only men for the job did not offend
Title VII.
In Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell,116 the Court adopted a two-

part test for establishing a BFOQ defense to an "age-based qualification purportedly justified by considerations of safety." ' In Criswell,
flight engineers were required by the employer's policy to retire at age

60.118 Two of the respondents had been captains119 who had applied for
reassignment as flight engineers120 prior to turning 60.121 The employer
denied both requests. 122 At trial, the employer asserted that the age-60

rule for flight engineers was a "BFOQ 'reasonably necessary' to the
safe operation of the airline." 128 The Court disagreed, holding that the
employer had failed to meet the second prong of the Tamiami test.12 4

112. The Court noted that a district court had described prison conditions in Alabama as
"rampant violence" and a "jungle atmosphere." Id. at 334 (quoting Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp.
318, 325 (M.D. Ala. 1976)).
113. 433 U.S. at 335. The Court said, "The employee's very womanhood would thus directly undermine her capacity to provide the security that is the essence of a correctional counselor's responsibility." Id. at 336.
114. Id.
115. The Court accepted the district court's finding that a correctional counselor was a
prison guard. Id. at 327 n.8.
116. 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
117. Id. at 417. The test originated in the Fifth Circuit decision of Usery v. Tamiami Trail
Tours, Inc., 531' F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
118. 472 U.S. at 402.
119. Id. at 404.
120. Id. at 405. The aircraft operated by Western required three crew members in the
cockpit: a captain (the pilot), a first officer (a co-pilot), and a flight engineer who monitored an
instrument panel. The flight engineer would not operate the flight controls unless the captain and
first officer became incapacitated. Id. at 403.
121. Id. at 405. A regulation of the Federal Aviation Administration prohibits any person
aged sixty from serving as a pilot or first officer on a commercial flight. Id. at 404 (citing 14
C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1985)).
122. Criswell, 472 U.S. at 405. The Court noted that the FAA had "refused to establish a
.mandatory retirement age for flight engineers." Id. at 404.
123. Id. at 406.
124. Id. at 423. The test was established in Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d
224 (5th Cir. 1976). The first prong of the test came from Diaz v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971). The Diaz element of the BFOQ defense "mandates that the
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While the employer had met the first prong by establishing that "good

health for a vital crew member is reasonably necessary to the essence
of the airline's operations,"1 5 Western Airlines did not meet its burden
of demonstrating that "all or nearly all employees [in the class] lack
the qualifications required for the position."' 26 Further, the employer
was unable to meet the alternative to the second prong by demonstrat-

ing that it was "highly impractical for the employer to insure by individual testing that its employees will have the necessary qualifications
'
for the job."127

The second branch of the BFOQ defense has been referred to as
same-sex.1 28 This branch relates not to the employee's ability to per-

form the tasks and responsibilities of her position but, rather, is an accommodation to the interests of third parties-historically clients or
customers-with whom the employee must interact in order to perform
the responsibilities and tasks of her job.12 ' In Backus v. Baptist Medical Center, 30 a male registered nurse brought suit against his employer

for refusing his requests to be assigned to the labor and delivery section
of the obstetrics and gynecology department.' 3 The court held that the
employer had met its burden of establishing that the same-sex require-

ment was necessary to the normal operation of its business and that the
employee had failed to show that the employer's articulated reasons

were a mere pretext. s2 Specifically, the court found that "[d]ue to the
intimate touching required in labor and delivery,"' 33 it was not a trait

job qualifications which the employer invokes to justify his discrimination must be reasonably
necessary to the essence of his business." Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 236. The Diaz element thus
adjusts to the safety factor. Id.The second prong of the test came from Weeks v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). Under Weeks "an employer has the burden of
proving that he had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or
substantially all [employees in the class] would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the
duties of the job involved." Id. at 235. There is an alternative to the main Weeks test for an
employer who can demonstrate that it is "impossible or highly impractical to deal with [persons in
the class] on an individualized basis." Id. at 235 n.5. Thus, the employer can meet the Weeks
requirement by establishing that "some members of the discriminated-against class possess a trait
precluding safe and efficient job performance that cannot be ascertained by means other than
knowledge of the applicant's membership in the class." 531 F.2d at 235. The Tamiami court
made clear that added expense is insufficient to meet the employer's burden under the alternative
Weeks prong. Id. at 235 n.26.
125. Criswell, 472 U.S. at 418.
126. Id.at 422.
127. Id.at 423.
128. See Sutton v. National Distillers Prod. Corp., 445 F. Supp. 1319, 1325 (S.D. Ohio
1978), affid, 628 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1980).
129. Id.
130. 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982).
131. Id. at 1192.
132. Id.at 1198.
133. Id. at 1195.
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associated with being male that was problematic but rather the very
sex itself which made all male nurses inappropriate."
A same-sex BFOQ case coming to a contrary conclusion was Bagley v. Watson,1 5 where two female prison guards brought a Title VII
action against their employer alleging that they were denied employment opportunity as a result of the designation of approximately ninety
percent of certain positions as male only. 3 The court held that under
the circumstances presented, sex was not a BFOQ and that Title VII
precluded the employer's exclusion of women from positions which required them to "perform clothed 'pat down' frisk searches and/or visual observations of male inmates.' ' 3 7 The court specifically rejected the
defendant's BFOQ argument based upon the privacy concerns of the
inmates and the preference of some inmates for male guards. " 8
2.

Business Necessity Defense

The second defense available to an employer in a Title VII action
is the business necessity defense traditionally applicable to cases of disparate impact. " 9 Judicially created, the business necessity defense has
its origin in Griggs v. Duke Power Co."' There, the employer required
a high school education or the passing of a standardized general intelligence test as a condition of employment for certain jobs."' The requirements operated to disqualify blacks for higher-paying positions at
a substantially greater rate than white employees also seeking those
positions because few blacks could pass the two tests." ' The Court
found that the record demonstrated that neither test was "shown to
bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs
for which it was used. '" 3 The Court held that even in the absence of
discriminatory intent on the part of the employer in implementing the
policy,"' the fact that the "requirements operated to render ineligible a

134. Id. The Court noted a conflict with the patient's constitutional right to privacy and
with the fact that the OB-GYN -nurse is not selected by the patient as would be a doctor. Id.
135. 579 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Or. 1983).
136. Id. at 1102.
137. Id. at 1104.
138. Id.at 1105.
139. Ordinarily, the evidence in disparate impact cases "focuses on statistical disparities
rather than specific incidents, and on competing explanations for those disparities." Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1989).
140. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
141. , Id. at 425-26.
142. Id. at 426.
143. Id. at 431.
144. The Court noted that the district court had found that prior to the Civil Rights Act the
employer had followed a policy of overt (intentional) racial discrimination, but, since the Act such
conduct had ceased. Id. at 428.
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markedly disproportionate number of Negroes" ' was sufficient to vioThe job relate the Act.1 ' "The touchstone is business necessity."
1 8 and "bear a dequirement must be "related to job performance,"'
monstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which
it was used.' 4 9 In sum, the burden is on the-employer to show that the
requirement has "a manifest relationship to the employment in
question." 5 0
The business necessity defense was further developed in Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody."" In Albemarle, employees were required to have
a high school diploma and to pass two standardized tests as a condition
52
to employment in certain skilled lines of work.' The employer had
hired an industrial psychologist to study the job relatedness of the testing program.' 5 The consultant concluded that the tests were job related-that is, "'significantly correlated with important elements of
work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for

which candidates are being evaluated.'

",'54

The Court disagreed, say-

ing that the study was flawed, and as a result could not be used to
determine whether the criteria used by the employer (the tests) were
"sufficiently related to the Company's legitimate interest in job-specific
ability.' 55 The Albemarle Court also made clear that even if an employer could demonstrate that the employment selection device was job
related, the complaining party, in order to prevail, still could show that
"other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial
effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient
and trustworthy workmanship.' 15
In summary, a plaintiff in an action under Title VII can base her
57
claim either on a theory of disparate treatment or disparate impact.'
While the former requires proof of intent to discriminate, either direct
145. Id. at 429.
146. "The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in
form but discriminatory in operation." Id. at 431.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 432.
151. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
152. Id.at 410-11.
153. Id. at 411.
154. Id. at 431 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c)).
155. Id.at 433.
156. Id. at 425. (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)).
The McDonnell Douglas Court said, "[the broad overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially
neutral employment and personnel decisions." 411 U.S. at 801.
157. In practice, many plaintiffs assert claims under both theories. See, e.g., Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2120 (interim ed. 1989).
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or inferential, the latter requires only a demonstration that "some employment practices, adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive [operate as the] functional[] equivalent to intentional discrimination. 1 58 Two defenses to a Title VII action are possible. The BFOQ
defense traditionally has been employed in cases of disparate treatment
with the business necessity defense reserved traditionally for cases of.
1 59
disparate impact.
The Seventh Circuit in Johnson Controls applied the business necessity defense to what is on its face a case of overt disparate treatment. Because the Johnson Controls court relied on the reasoning of
Wright v. Olin Corp.'60 and Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital'' to

support its conclusion, it is necessary to examine the Wright and Hayes
decisions in detail.
B.

Earlier Cases Addressing Fetal Protection Policies

1. Wright v. Olin Corp.
The Fourth Circuit was the first court of appeals to pass judgment
upon the permissibility of an employer's fetal protection policy when it
considered Wright'" in 1982. Wright was a consolidated action involving the claims of both individual plaintiffs and the EEOC which had
charged Olin with race and sex discrimination. 8 In particular, the
plaintiffs questioned Olin's "'female employment and fetal vulnerability'" policy,'"
The Olin policy created three job classifications. 6 5 Fertile
women166 were excluded from restricted jobs which involved contact
with or exposure to " 'known or suspected 'abortifacient or teratogenic
agents'."16 7 Pregnant women could be excluded from controlled jobs

158. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988).
159. The Court most recently urged the application of the business necessity defense to a
disparate impact claim in Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2124-27.
160. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
161. 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984).
162. 697 F.2d at 1172.
163. Id. at 1175-76.
164. Id. at 1182.
165. Id.
166. Any woman between the ages of 5 and 63 was assumed to be fertile in the absence of
evidence to the contrary. Id.
167. Id. Harm to a fetus can occur in a number of ways. First, a fetus can be harmed by a
toxic chemical (fetotoxin) that would also harm a child or adult (carbon monoxide, e.g.). Second,
a teratogen can affect the dividing cells of the fetus and cause structural or functional defects or
deformities. Thalidomide was a teratogen that caused gross limb deformities. Third, a transplacental carcinogen can cross the placenta and cause cancer in the lifetime of the child. Fourth,
chemical or physical agents (mutagens) can harm the germ cells of either parent prior to conception and result in congenital defects or developmental problems when the child inherits from either
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68 Non-pregwhich required limited contact with harmful chemicals.
nant women could work in controlled jobs only after signing a form
1 6 Unrestricted
indicating their recognition of a risk, though slight.
jobs, those that did not pose a hazard to a pregnant woman or fetus,
were open to all women. 170 Men Were orally warned about lead expo171
sure in keeping with OSHA regulations but were not restricted.
action under both disparate treatment and disparate
Plaintiffs brought
17 2
impact theories.
The employer contended that the proper framework was disparate
treatment and that the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine inferential framework should be utilized.17 3 The plaintiffs asserted that the policy was
overtly discriminatory, that the McDonnell Douglas proof scheme was
inapplicable, and that the employer could prevail only by establishing a
BFOQ defense.174 The Fourth Circuit conceded that the facts before it
did "not fit with absolute precision into any of the developed theobut concluded that the appropriate analytic framework was
ries,"
76
disparate impact coupled with the business necessity defense.'
The court had three reasons for the adoption of the disparate impact - business necessity approach. First, were the BFOQ defense to be
applied, the employer could not assert a justification defense to which it
was entitled under Title VII doctrine.17 7 Second, while the policy was
said to be expressed in gender-neutral terms, its obvious and intended
consequence was to impose on women a burden that men need not suf-

parent an abnormal genetic structure. Ionizing radiation is an example of a mutagen. Williams,
Firing the Women to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment
Opportunity Goals under Title VII, 69 GEo. L.J. 641, 655-56 (1981).
168. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1182. Permission to work would be determined on a case by case
basis. Id. Originally, the policy prohibited all pregnant women from working at controlled jobs but
two weeks later the policy was revised. Id. at 1182 n.12.
169. Id. at 1182.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1183-84. Plaintiffs urged use of the BFOQ defense in light of the policy's facial
discrimination or, in the alternative, the Griggs frariiework for disparate impact. Id.
173. Id. at 1183. This inferential framework was established in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248
(1981). The employer contended that the purpose of the policy was to protect the unborn fetus
and that plaintiffs had not successfully proven pretext. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1183.
174. Id. In the alternative, plaintiffs asserted that if the policy was construed as facially
neutral (based upon the potential for pregnancy), the case was one of disparate impact to which
the business necessity defense was applicable. Id. at 1184.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1185. The court characterized the disparate treatment/McDonnell Douglas
scheme urged by the employer as wholly inappropriate. Id.
177. Id. at 1185 n.21. The court recognized that the BFOQ defense was meant to be a
narrow exception. Id. The court also concluded that the employer could not prevail under a BFOQ
defense. Id. at 1186 n.21.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol15/iss2/5

1990]

TITLE VII BUSINESS NECESSITY DEFENSE

fer. 17' Third, the Supreme Court in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty17 9 had

applied disparate impact analysis to an employer's policy which required a pregnant woman to take a leave of absence and denied her
seniority accumulated during maternity leave.1 80
In adopting a disparate impact.- business necessity framework, the
Fourth Circuit held that "the existence and operation of the fetal vulnerability program established as a matter of law a prima facie case of
Title VII violation."1 8 In remanding the case, the Wright court provided four rules to the district court to aid its application of the business necessity defense to a factual situation involving a fetal protection
2
18

policy.

First, the employer must demonstrate that "significant risks of
harm" to unborn children exist in the workplace.' Second, the risks
must be confined to the children of women workers and not men workers.'" Third, the necessity of a program of protective measures confined to women must be demonstrated.185 Last, the "effectiveness of the
actual program for the intended purposes must be established-by independent, objective evidence."' 188
The court emphasized that all elements of the business necessity

178. The court reasoned that a facially neutral policy, as here, that has a discriminatory
impact is the classic fact situation to which the Griggs framework applies. Id.
179. 434 U.S. 136 (1977). The Court in Satty stated, "On its face, petitioner's seniority
policy appears to be neutral in its treatment of male and female employees. . . Petitioner's
decision not to treat pregnancy as a disease or disability for purposes of seniority retention is not
on its face a discriminatory policy." Id. at 140.
180. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1186. The district court had treated the case as one of disparate
treatment and found that plaintiffs had failed to prove the requisite intent to discriminate. Id. at
1187.
181. Id.
182. The Wright court held that under certain circumstances an employer may, as a business necessity, impose a restriction on employees to protect the health of unborn children of
women workers. Id. at 1189. The court likened the unborn child to a business customer, deserving
of lesser protection than. the worker but more protection than visitors. Id.
183. Id. at 1190.
184. Id.
185. Id. It is interesting to note that the Fourth Circuit has specified that dollar cost alone
is not determinative in establishing a business necessity. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F. 2d
791, 799 n.8 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
186. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1190. These elements of a business necessity defense were adopted
nearly intact from Lorillard:
The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the
practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business. Thus, the business
purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact; the challenged practice must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and there must be
available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which would better accomplish the
business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential racial
impact.
444 F.2d at 798 (footnotes omitted).
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87
defense "must be established by independent, objective evidence,"'
that the defense must be "supported by the opinion evidence of quali188 and that it is "not necesfied experts in the relevant scientific fields,"
sary to prove the existence of a general consensus on the points within
the qualified scientific community."' 89
Finally, the Wright court made clear that once the employer had
established the risk of harm (necessity) and effectiveness of the challenged program to avoid it, 900 the plaintiff might still prevail by proof
that there were acceptable alternative policies that equally protect
9
against the harm with lesser differential impact." '

2.

Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital

92
In Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital, a pregnant x-ray technician brought suit claiming that the employer violated Title VII by
98 The district
firing her immediately upon learning of her pregnancy.'
94 The Eleventh
court, sitting without a jury, found for the plaintiff.
Circuit affirmed.' 95
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by concluding that the
hospital's action-firing the plaintiff because she was pregnant-was
discriminatory on its face, thus precluding use of the McDonnell Doug9
las - Burdine inferential framework.' The starting point of the Eleventh Circuit thus conflicts with that of the Fourth Circuit in Wright, as
the latter based its analysis on the premise that the employer's fetal
97
protection policy was on its face neutral.1 The difference which should
result from two opposite starting points disappeared, however, when the

187. A good faith belief by the employer that the program is necessary or effective will not
suffice. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1190.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1191.
It suffices to show that within that community there is so considerable a body of opinion that significant risk exists, and that it is substantially confined to women workers, that
an informed employer could not responsibly- fail to act on the assumption that this opinion
might be the accurate one.

Id.
190. This would establish the employer's prima facie defense. Id.
191. Id. The Wright court asserted that should the plaintiff put forward enough "rebuttal"
evidence on acceptable alternatives, the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of disparate
treatment. Id. at 1192. The theory would shift from disparate impact to disparate treatment because the plaintiff has been successful in demonstrating that the stated purpose of the policy or
practice was a mere pretext for discrimination. Id.
192. 726 F.2d 1543 (lth Cir. 1984).
193. Id. at 1546.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1547-48.
197. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1186. The Hayes court indicated that Wright did not make clear
whether it was applying pre or post PDA principles. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1546 n.2.
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Hayes court created a novel maneuver that effectively converted a
facially discriminatory policy on the part of the employer into a neutral
198
one.

The mechanics of the Hayes maneuver are simple. Ordinarily, a
facially discriminatory policy is said to violate Title VII unless the employer mounts a successful affirmative defense under BFOQ. 119 Maintaining a BFOQ defense is tantamount to admitting that a policy or
practice is discriminatory while at the same time asserting reasons for
discrimination which justify and legitimate a practice which in the absence of the justification would be repugnant to Title VII. Under a
BFOQ defense, the discriminatory character of the employer policy or
practice does not change. Rather, the availability of the statutory defense is an expression of society's willingness to tolerate some apparent
and conspicuous discrimination where the employee is unable to perform the duties of the job assigned.
Under the Hayes maneuver, a facially discriminatory policy need
not be justified as a BFOQ. If the employer's policy can be said to
protect the offspring of all employees, the mere presumption of discrimination is effectively rebutted. In other words, if a policy which
discriminates on the basis of sex or pregnancy "effectively and equally
protects the offspring of all employees," 00 the policy itself shifts in
character from facially discriminatory to facially non-discriminatory. 0 1
The Hayes maneuver "neutralizes" the policy, and makes it eligible for
treatment under disparate impact theory.10 2
The Hayes maneuver is novel203 because it permits a facially discriminatory policy to be transformed rather than justified. The most
troublesome aspect of the transformation is that it requires the court to
determine the essential scientific questions of whether the workplace
presents substantial risks of harm to unborn children and whether the
employer's policy can prevent that harm. Ordinarily, the court is better
198. The court appears to recognize that in a case of facial discrimination, only the BFOQ
defense is applicable. Id. at 1548.
199. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) & (e) (1982).
200. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1548.
201. This transformation appears to occur because the noble intentions of the employer
override his or her impermissible actions of adopting a discriminatory policy.
202. Judge Posner, in his dissent in Johnson Controls, called this process "stitch[ing] a new
defense." 886 F.2d at 903. 203. It should be noted that the Hayes maneuver requires two conceptual shifts for execution. First, whereas the stated target of the policy is female employees only, the Hayes maneuver
broadens the reach of the policy to include "all employees." 726 F.2d at 1548. After the operation
of the maneuver, the policy is said to address both male and female employees. Second, whereas
the stated workplace policy is directed to employees, after the maneuver the interests of nonemployees (unborn children) are implicated, and are, in fact, superior to employee interests. See
id.
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prepared to answer questions of policy rather than questions of scientific fact. The application of the business necessity defense to fetal protection policies, therefore, thrusts the court into an arena in which it is
less comfortable and less skilled.2 '
The Hayes court looked to Wright for the specifics of20an5 employer
showing to rebut the presumption of facial discrimination. First, the
employer must demonstrate that there is "a substantial risk of harm to
the fetus or potential offspring of women employees from the women's
exposure, either during pregnancy or while fertile, to toxic hazards in
the hazard
the workplace." 206 Second, the employer must show "that
20
Hayes
The
applies to fertile or pregnant women, but not to men."
court also adopted from Wright the evidentiary requirements of objec2 °8
tive, scientific evidence that need not reflect a general consensus
Should the employer be unable to rebut the presumption of. discrimination by producing evidence of substantial risk and isolation of that risk
to female employees, the employer would be left only with the BFOQ
defense.2 0 9 The Hayes court indicated that the employer would be able
is unable
to prevail under the BFOQ defense only if "the excluded class210
to perform the duties that constitute the essence of the job.
In applying its newly created framework to the facts before it, the
Eleventh Circuit found that the employer failed to meef its burden of
demonstrating that radiation from x-rays "posed a significant risk of
harm to Hayes's [sic] fetus. ' 11 Since the employer failed to meet his
threshold burden, the court was not 'required to reach the issues of
whether x-ray radiation affects the offspring of only women employees 212 and whether there were available alternative policies with a
204. Judge Easterbrook addresses the difference between policy and factual arguments in a
dissenting comment: "so long as the substantive role of law requires a court to resolve scientific
disagreements-which the Wright-Hayes standard does, though the BFOQ standard avoids the
problem-the judge must follow the rules which means that material disputes must be resolved at
trial." Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 916 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
205. The Hayes court indicated that it was borrowing these requirements from Wright v.
Olin Corp. but "[b]ecause we approach this case differently than did the Olin court, we do not
label these requirements as 'business necessity'. Nevertheless, our approach and that of Olin require an identical showing by an employer for the employer to prevail." Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1548
n.8.

206. Id. at 1548.
207. Id.
208. Id. The Hayes court also indicated that in the absence of scientific evidence regarding
hazards to men, an employer may direct its policy only to women. Id. at 1549.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1550. At one point in its analysis the court referred to an "unreasonable risk of
harm to the fetus." Id. at 1550. The "unreasonable" language would appear to create a question
as to the appropriate evidentiary standard.
212. Id. at 1552.
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lesser discriminatory effect.21 3
The court in Hayes also conducted a disparate impact analysis on
the record before it. " " Disparate impact analysis under the Hayes formulation 18 is conducted, however, only after the employer successfully
rebuts the plaintiff's prima facie case of facial discrimination, thus creating "an automatic prima facie case of disparate impact."2"' To reach
the disparate impact stage with a facially non-neutral policy, the employer already would have demonstrated substantial risk of harm to the
fetus and isolation of harm to women, and thus would not need to present additional proof to mount a business necessity defense. 1 Instead,
the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that there are "acceptable alternative policies that would better accomplish the purposes of
promoting fetal health, or that would accomplish the purpose with a
less adverse impact on one sex."2 18
The Eleventh Circuit in Hayes made clear that "potential litigation costs [may not] form the basis for the business necessity [defense] ."121 The only salient issues surrounding the permissibility of a
fetal protection policy are: (1) whether there is a substantial risk of
harm to the fetus of a working woman, (2) whether that harm is transmitted only through the mother, and (3) whether there are available
alternative policies or practices with a lesser restrictive effect on the
woman employee.
3.

Summary
While the decisions in both Wright and Hayes addressed employer

213. Id. at 1551.
214. The court stated that the district court "lacked the benefit of the approach we have
outlined here." Id. at 1552. Assuming that the hospital on remand might be able to rebut the
plaintiff's case of facial discrimination, the Eleventh Circuit set out to demonstrate that even if the
employer were not liable under a theory of disparate treatment, the employer would still be liable
under disparate impact theory. Id.
215. The Hayes court suggested that if the employer rebuts the presumption of facial discrimination by producing evidence of substantial harm to the fetus and isolation of the risk to
women, "the employee has an automatic prima facie case of disparate impact." Id. Under disparate impact, "the employer is entitled to assert the defense of business necessity.", Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1553.
218. Id. The Hayes court then approved the district court's findings that the hospital failed
to explore seriously "alternatives that would accomplish the Hospital's purpose with a less discriminatory impact." Id. at 1553-54.
219. Id. at 1552 n.15. The court stated,
[iun sum, we believe that potential liability is too contingent and too broad a factor to
amount to a 'business necessity.' Rather under our formulation of business necessity, the
defense in a fetal protection case is justified by a genuine desire to promote the health of
employee offspring, not by self-interest.
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policies ostensibly designed to protect the unborn children of working
mothers, each court took a fundamentally different approach to analyzing the case. The court in Wright concluded that the employer policy
was facially neutral and analyzed the case under disparate impact business necessity theory. In contrast, the Hayes court recognized that
the employer's policy was facially discriminatory but created a presumption of discrimination which could be rebutted by evidence which
showed that the policy protected the offspring of all employees.

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Tenuous Foundation of Wright-Hayes

2 °
The Seventh Circuit in UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. in concluding that a fetal protection policy can be justified by a business necessity defense,2 2 1 utilized a tenuous foundation upon which to build its
analysis. As a result, the court's conclusion departs from the language
of Title VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the case law which
interprets them.
222
The foundation provided by Wright v. Olin Corp. is especially
vulnerable. In holding that a business necessity defense is applicable to
228 the Wright court made two
a case involving a fetal protection policy,
unconventional findings. First, the court labeled the case as disparate
impact, stating that the policy was expressed in gender-neutral
terms. 22 ' However, because the policy applies only to fertile women,
225 it is difficult to assert
pregnant women, and non-pregnant women
2
Additionally, the Wright.
that the policy is fully gender-neutral.
22" seems misplaced since
Satty
v.
Co.
Gas
court's reliance on Nashville

220. 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. granted. 110 S. Ct. 1522 (interim ed. 1990).
221. Id. at 887, 901.
222. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
223. Id. at 1185.
224. Id. at 1186.
225. Id. at 1182. The employer's own label for the program was "female employment and
fetal vulnerability." Id.
226. The Wright court suggested that to argue the facial neutrality of the policy is to be
involved in "mere semantic quibbling having no relevance to the underlying substantive principle
that gave rise to this [disparate impact] theory." Id. at 1186.
227. 434 U.S. 136 (1977). The Court in Satty held that the employer's policy of refraining
from granting sick leave pay to pregnant employees did not violate Title VII and said that the
employer's "decision not to treat pregnancy as a disease or disability for purposes of seniority
retention is not on its face a discriminatory policy." Id. at 140. The PDA was intended to make
distinctions based on pregnancy per se violations of Title VII, thus eliminating the need for a
court to rely on the disparate impact approach used by the Court in Gilbert and Satty. See H.R.
REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4749,
4751.
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the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 228 effectively superceded the Satty

result.229 Second, unless the Wright court meant something different
from what it stated, one of its asserted reasons for not applying the
BFOQ defense is circular. The court stated that if the BFOQ defense
were "properly applied, it would prevent the employer from asserting a
justification defense"2 0 to which it would be entitled under developed
disparate impact theory. The Fourth Circuit concluded that under the
circumstances the employer should be able to assert a broader defense
theory than would be allowed under the admittedly narrow BFOQ exception.2"' Further, the court stated that if the BFOQ defense were
applicable, the employer would not be able to prevail. 23 2 Thus, because
the employer could not prevail under the correct defense (BFOQ), another defense (business necessity) should be made available. The

court's decision is inappropriate in light of the language in Title VII

which states that where sex is not a BFOQ "reasonably necessary to

the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise, ' 2 3 it
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to make an
employment decision on the basis of sex.234
The Johnson Controls court's reliance on Hayes v. Shelby Memo,rialHospital2 3 6 also is problematic. The starting point for Hayes was
that an employment policy which applies only to women is facially dis-

criminatory. 2 6 Ordinarily, such an assertion indicates a case of dispa-

rate treatment under Title VII to which the BFOQ defense applies.
However, with the operation of the Hayes maneuver, the facially dis-

criminatory policy was transformed into a facially neutral one and the
finding of discrimination transformed to a mere presumption. 23 7 The

Hayes court thereupon borrowed the requirements of the business necessity defense from Wright, disavowed that the employer defense was
228. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). The language of the Act in part provides that "women
affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected." Id.
229. See California Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 395 (9th Cir.
1985), affid, 475 U.S. 1139 (1987). Satty, decided before the PDA, relied on Gilbert and concluded that the employer's policy of not awarding sick-leave pay to pregnant employees while
awarding it to employees missing work because of non-pregnancy reasons was gender-neutral. 434
U.S. at 143-44.
230. 697 F.2d at 1185 n.21.
231. Id.
232. The court stated, "a b.f.o.. defense.., obviously cannot be established .
Id. at
1186 n.21.
233. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982)..
234. Id.
255. 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984).
236. The court in Hayes states, "if the employer's policy by its terms applies only to women
or pregnant women, then the policy is facially discriminatory." Id. at 1548.
237. Id.
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business necessity 288 and created a hybrid defense with significant policy implications. The result was that the court sanctioned the em2 9 in spite of its
ployer's consideration of the interests of the fetus
harm is
stated belief that, under the BFOQ defense, potential for24 fetal
0
court
The
irrelevant unless it affects a mother's job performance.
clearly stated that when a policy is facially discriminatory, there is no
BFOQ defense unless the employer shows a direct relationship between
4
the policy and the actual ability of the employee to perform her job. '
By adopting the Hayes framework, the Seventh Circuit broadened its
scope of analysis and strayed from its essential inquiry which should
have been to determine whether the employer could have met its burden of demonstrating that fertile and pregnant women were unable to
perform the tasks which constitute the essence of the job to which they
were assigned. 2
B. BFOQ: The Appropriate Defense in Cases Involving Fetal Protection Policies
Even though the BFOQ defense was rejected by the courts in
Wright,2 43 Hayes,2 44 and Johnson Controls2 45 in favor of a defense that

resembles business necessity, it is the assertion of this writer that the
BFOQ defense, while concededly narrow, is the appropriate defense for
a fetal protection policy implicating either pregnant or fertile women.
and
A policy targeted to pregnant women is facially discriminatory
246
thus is repugnant to Title VII unless justified as a BFOQ.

A policy

4 7 and
targeted to fertile women manifests "sex-plus" discrimination
24
thus also can be justified only on the basis of a BFOQ.

238. Id. at 1548 n.8 ("[W]e do not label these requirements as 'business necessity'.").
239. Id. at 1549.
240. Id. (quoting Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 546 F. Supp. 259, 264 (N.D. Ala.
1982)).
241.

Id.

242. See id.
243. 697 F.2d at 1185.
244. 726 F.2d at 1549 n.9. The Hayes court.viewed the BFOQ defense as an alternative
defense to be used only when the employer is unable to rebut the presumption of facial discrimination by showing substantial risk of harm to the fetus and transmission of the risk only through the
mother. Id. at 1548-49. According to the court in Hayes, the employer is not likely to prevail. Id.
at 1549 n.9.
245. 886 F.2d at 887. The business necessity defense was also permitted in Steele v. Illinois
App. 3d 577, 580, 513 N.E. 2d 1177, 1179, appeal denied, 117
Human Rights Comm'n, 160 Ill.
(1987).
1096
Ill. 2d 554, 517 N.E.2d
246. The Sixth Circuit recently came to the same conclusion in Grant v. General Motors
Corp., 908 F.2d 1303 (6th Cir. 1990) (fetal protection policy amounts to overt sex discrimination
and cannot be countenanced without proof that infertility is a BFOQ).
247. Female plus fertile.
248. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
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1. BFOQ Defense Appropriate for Policy Addressed to Fertile

Women
The fetal protection policy of Johnson Controls is targeted primarily to fertile women.2 4' The Johnson Controls court apparently assumed that a fetal protection policy violates the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA). 25 0 Nothing, however, in the PDA itself or its
legislative history mandates the conclusion that Congress intended the
PDA to cover fertility based (pre-conception) workplace policies. In
fact, fertility is a condition applicable to both men and women. 51
There is little in the legislative history of the PDA to suggest that

Congress intended the PDA also to apply to discrimination based on
fertility. The language of the Act refers to "pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions." ' Arguably, it would have been easy for
Congress to have included the term "fertility" had it intended to include fertility within the reach of the amendment. Commentators,2 51
however, have pointed to language in the report accompanying H.R.
6075 as evidence that Congress intended the PDA also to cover discrimination based upon fertility.2 Ignored is the next sentence in the
report which suggests that the PDA covers only conception through de-

livery and any related medical complications. 55 Further support that
the PDA was not meant to cover fertility per se is that the term "fertility" is mentioned nowhere in the House 56 or Senate2 57 reports nor in
the Senate debate on the bill. 58
249.

Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 876. All women with childbearing capacity are affected.

Id.
250. Id. at 893. The Sixth Circuit has also made the same assumption. See Grant v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1303 (6th Cir. 1990) (PDA transforms distinctions based on potential pregnancy into overt sex discrimination in the absence of a showing that infertility is a
BFOQ).
251. During the Senate debate on S. 995, the forerunner of the PDA, Senator Biden, the
bill's cosponsor, chided his colleagues for their "brilliant observation" that only women can get
pregnant. See 123 CONG. REC. S29,661 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1977) (statement of Sen. Biden). The
same cannot be said for fertility.
252. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
253. See, e.g., Special Project, Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding Conception, Pregnancy and Birth, 39 VAND. L. REv. 597, 845 n.1556 (1986) (legislative history indicates that the
amendment extended protection to both fertile and pregnant women).
254. See H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 4753, 4791. The report specifies: "[i]n using the broad phrase "women affected
by pregnancy, childbirth and related medical conditions," the bill makes clear that its protection
extends to the whole range of matters concerning the childbearing process." Id. (emphasis
added).
255. The report states: "At the same time, the bill i[s] intended to be limited to effects upon
a woman who is herself pregnant, bearing a child, or has a related medical condition .
Id.
256. Id. at 1-18, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4749-66.
257. S. RaP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-17 (1977).
258. See 123 CONG. REC. S29,640-65 (daily ed. Sept. 16, (1977).
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If the PDA does not cover discrimination based on fertility, the
employer policy in Johnson Controls, insofar as it applies primarily to
discrimination.
fertile women, can be considered a case of "sex-plus"
59
but not all women.
Here, the employer discriminates against women
60
Only fertile women are affected by the policy. Hence, the policy discriminates against employees who are women plus fertile. If the PDA
does not cover fertility, then the Johnson Controls' policy must be evaluated in light of pre-PDA principles.
6
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.. sets forth the applicable stan-

dard in a "sex-plus" case under Title VII. In Martin Marietta, the
employer did not accept applications from women with pre-school-age
children but did accept applications from men with pre-school-age chilof
dren.262 The employer was found to have discriminated on the basis 63
not only sex, but also those persons with pre-school-age children.
More importantly, the Court was specific in its direction on remand
an employer policy could be justified only on the basis of a
that such
2 64
BFOQ.
2. BFOQ Defense Appropriate for Policy Addressed to Pregnant
Women
Even though the Johnson Controls fetal protection policy is directed primarily to fertile women, it may, under unusual circumstances,
reach pregnant women also.' " Thus, the policy also must be considered

under post-PDA case law. In Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock

Co. v. EEOC 66 the Court stated that "discrimination based on a wo'2 6
man's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex."
Thus, that part of Johnson Controls' policy that implicates pregnant
Facial discrimination is defensible
women is discrimination on its face.
s
only on the basis of a BFOQ.
The policy pertains only to women. 886 F.2d at 876.
Id. at 876, 877-78.
400 U.S. 542 (1971).
Id. at 543.
Id. at 544.
Id.
Tubal ligation is the most common means of inducing female infertility. See COLUMGUIDE 144
BIA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS, COMPLETE HOME MEDICAL
(1985). The procedure involves cutting or tying the fallopian tubes so that the egg can no longer
permatravel to the uterus to be fertilized. Id. at 143. Even though tubal ligation is a relatively
nent means of sterilization, on occasion the procedure is ineffective and the woman can still become pregnant. Thus a woman whose inability to bear children has been medically documented
may still on rare occasion be able to conceive.
.266. 462 U.S. 669 (1983)..
267. Id. at 684.
268. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1982); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775,
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
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. Since each prong of the Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy,2 ' standing alone, is only justifiable on the basis of a BFOQ under
established case law, it seems inconceivable that the policy when considered as a whole could be justified on the basis of the broader business necessity defense.
C. Interests Upon Which a BFOQ Defense May be Based
Assuming that the BFOQ defense is appropriately applied to a fetal protection policy, Section 2000e-2(e)(1) of Title VII makes clear
that the stated justification must be "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." ' 0 The language of the statute does not make clear, however, whether the employer may base a justification on the interests of parties other than
himself.
Courts have interpreted Title VII to incorporate employer interest
in ensuring that employees will be able to perform their job."'1 The
critical question in Johnson Controls is whether the interest of the fetus may serve as the basis for an employer justification under the
BFOQ defense."' While the court in Johnson Controls answered this
question in the affirmative, the answer should be negative for three reasons. First, there is nothing in the history or language of Title VII or
the PDA to suggest that Congress intended to implicate the interests of
unborn children when they are contrary to those of the mother under
Title VII. Second, even though the Court has recognized the interests
of consumers under Title VII, unborn children are distinguishable from
consumers and it is inappropriate to further extend the reach of Title
VII doctrine to unborn children. Third, the interests of unborn children
are adequately protected under OSHA and thus do not need to be protected under Title VII.
1. Title VII Does Not Implicate the Interests of Unborn Children
On the most observable level, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1786 (interim ed. 1989) (Title VII identifies one circumstance in which an employer
may take
gender into account in making an employment decision-where gender is a BFOQ.).
269. One prong addresses fertile women; the other addresses pregnant women.
270. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2e(l) (1982).
271. 109 S. Ct. at 1786 (goal of Title VII is to "eradicate discrimination while
preserving
workplace efficiency").
272. This question was raised but not answered in Grant v. General Motors, 908
F.2d 1303
(6th Cir. 1990). See Johnson Controls, Inc., v. California Fair Emp. & Hous. Comm'n,
218 Cal.
App. 3d 517, 542, 267 Cal. Rptr. 158, 172 (1990). The EEOC, in concurring with
the dissent by
Judge Cudahy in Johnson Controls approves employer consideration of potential third-party
interests. See EEOC Policy Guide, supra note 49, at :6801.
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27
i964 concerns itself with the rights of employees and employers.
However, the interests of other parties also are said to be incorporated

into Title VII. Consumer interests are said to be incorporated as the
beneficiary of "efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through
2
fair and racially neutral employment and personnel decisions." , The
on an intiprivacy interests of persons with whom employees interact
27 5
Backus v.
In
VII.
Title
under
mate basis also have been considered
Baptist Medical Center2 7 the privacy interests of patients in a hospital
obstetrics and gynecology wing were sufficient to serve as the basis for

an employer BFOQ defense. The safety interests of airline passengers

Airhave also been recognized under Title VII. In Burwell v. Eastern
27 8
277
the
Inc.
lines, Inc. and Harriss v. Pan American World Airways,

safety interests of passengers were sufficient to justify employer policies
2 79
which resulted in differential treatment of pregnant flight attendants.

Therefore, it would appear that the interests of third parties under

some circumstances are sufficient to serve as the basis for an employer
BFOQ defense. It is clear that the Fourth Circuit in Wright recognized

the separate interests of the third-party unborn child within the em-

ployee's body when it analogized the unborn child to the customer of a
business. 80
28
There is nothing in either the legislative history of Title VII 1 or
the PDA 28 2 however, to suggest that Congress wished to implicate the
interests of unborn children separate and apart from the working
mothers who carry them.
The House report accompanying H.R. 7152 stated that Title VII
was designed to "eliminate discriminatory employment practices by

273. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1785 (interim ed. 1989) (Title VII
creates a balance between employee rights and employer prerogatives).
274. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
275. See supra notes 127-137 and accompanying text. See also Local 567 American Fed. v.
Michigan Council 25, 635 F. Supp. 1010, 1012 (E.D. Mich. 1986) ("It is clear that in certain
situations privacy rights of individuals will justify sex-based classifications.").
276. 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982).
277. 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980).
278. 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 947 (9th Cir. 1980).
279. Burwell was decided under pre-PDA law; the court characterized as facially neutral a
policy mandating maternity leave. 633 F.2d at 369. Harrisswas decided under both pre- and postPDA law since appellants sought relief implicating time periods both before and after the PDA
amended Title VII. See 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 948.
280. 697 F.2d at 1189. The court in Hayes specifically declined to endorse the Wright approach which equated a fetus with a business invitee or licensee. 726 F.2d at 1552 n.14. The
Hayes court did however, recognize fetal protection as a "legitimate area of employer concern."
Id.
See S. REP. No. 872, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2355; H.R.
No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2391.

281.
REP.

282. See S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol15/iss2/5
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business, labor unions, or employment agencies...,,a8 Comments
made by both supporters and detractors 84 of the legislation emphasized that the interests implicated are those of employer and employee.
That all segments of the citizenry have a right to gainful employment
was expressed perhaps most eloquently in a supplementary report filed
by Judge WilliamM. McCulloch and others:
[in other titles of this bill we have endeavored to protect the Negro's
right to first-class citizenship. Through voting, education, equal protection of.the laws, and free access to places of public accommodations,
means have been fashioned to eliminate racial discrimination.
The right to vote, however, does not have much meaning on an
empty stomach. The impetus to achieve excellence in education is lacking if gainful employment is closed to the graduate. The opportunity to
enter a restaurant or hotel is a shallow victory where one's pockets are
2 85
empty.
In light of the express purpose of Title VII-to enhance employment opportunity and ensure that jobs are filled on the basis of qualification while leaving undisturbed. management prerogatives insofar as
they are not discriminatory 28--the finding of the Seventh Circuit in
Johnson Controls that Title VII permits discrimination directed to female workers based on a desire to protect the next generation is ironic.
In addition, there is nothing in the PDA to suggest that the interests of an unborn child may serve as the basis for discrimination in
employment directed to the mother. In fact, just the opposite is true.
The Act was promulgated to preserve the "central purpose of the sex
discrimination prohibitions of Title VII. ' ' 287 If the purpose of the PDA
is to prevent discrimination based upon actual pregnancy, and the purpose of Title VII is to prevent discrimination against women based
upon any other grounds, it is illogical to conclude that pregnancy or
some other condition (sex plus fertility) can justify discrimination. The
basic purpose of the bill is to protect women.2 88 The holding in Johnson
Controls undermines that protection.

283.

H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in,1964 U.S.

CODE CONG. &

ADMIN. NEWS 2391.

284. See 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 2426 (Title VII will have "far-reaching consequences on both management and labor; [the title] constitutes an important but ill-devised limitation upon the area of discretion and decision making of both American businesses and
American workers.").
285. Id. at 2513.
286. Id. at 2516.
287. S. REP.No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 3 (1977).
288. Id. at 5.
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2. Unborn Children Are Unlike Customers and Their Interests Do
Not Warrant Extension of Title VII Doctrine
Even though Title VII has been said to implicate the interests of
customers and clients, 289 unborn children are enough unlike customers
to discourage extension of third-party protection under Title VII to unborn children. First, unborn children are distinguishable from customers in the role that they play in the employer's business. Customers
play a central and positive role in any business. It is not an understatement to say that customers are the raison d'etre of the business, for
without customers, the business will cease to exist. Any business organization takes in raw materials and other inputs from the environment,
transforms the raw materials through the technology unique to that
290
business, and returns the inputs in changed form to the environment.
Without customers or clients to make use of the output of the organization, the production of the organization gets "backed up" and, over
time, the organization lacks the resources with which to obtain additional inputs from the environment.291 Ultimately, the organization
must cease to produce or offer its service. In contrast, the unborn child
plays no role in the employer's business. Further, to the extent that the
presence of an unborn child adversely affects the role performance of a
truly critical party-the employee herself-the role played by an unborn child is negative with respect to the employer's operations.
Second, the unborn child is distinguishable from the customer by
29
the manner in which the employer responds to each. A business organization in order to survive293 must develop and nurture relationships
with customers and clients. The typical organization expends substantial resources in defining a market and directing efforts to it. Further,
any business organization regularly monitors the environment and modifies its business practices based upon input from customers and clients.
All of these actions are conscious and proactive. In contrast, an organization typically undertakes no proactive efforts directed to unborn children. At best, the business merely reacts to the presence of an unborn
child. 2 4. Most often, the fetus is ignored. In sum, the organization seeks

289.

See supra notes 278-85 and accompanying text.

290. See J. THOMPSON,

ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTiON

19-23 (1969).

291. Id. at 21.
292. Whether an employer can have any relationship with an unborn child is a matter of
debate. If an employer-fetal relationship is possible, however, the relationship should vary depending on whether the fetus is viable or non-viable.
293. This assumes non-monopoly business conditions.
294. This difference between proactivity and reactivity is arguably a reflection of the organization's perceptions of customer and fetal centrality to business operations. See supra notes 29092 and accompanying text.
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to cultivate relationships with customers and to increase the size of its
customer base; the organization neither seeks to increase the number of
unborn children in its sphere of operations nor directs any efforts to
them.
Because unborn children are so dissimilar to customers and clients
from the employer's perspective, there is scant reason to extend the
reach of Title VII from customer interests to interests of unborn children. An employer should not be permitted to justify a workplace policy under Title VII on the basis of the interests of unborn children.
3. The Interests of the Unborn Child and the Fertile Employee are
Adequately Protected by Adherence to OSHA Regulations
While neither Title VII nor the PDA contains any mention of fetus or fertility, 9 5 the OSHA standards pertaining to lead 2 96 contain no
fewer than eighteen references to fertility and fetal issues. Specifically,
these standards make reference to an employee's ability to procreate a
healthy child, 97 reproductive problems, 98 pregnancy and fertility testing,2 99 special precautions applicable when a family is planned,3 0 0 information needed by employees to adequately assess the danger of lead to o
the reproductive system, 01' the employer's responsibility to provide
medical advice when so desired by an employee who wants to procreate
a healthy child, 802 temporary removal of workers who are planning to
raise children,30 8 and the need for a physician to maintain an adequate
medical history with respect to reproductive problems.30 ' The discussion of the adverse effects of lead on male and female reproductive systems is especially detailed.30 5
In light of OSHA's demonstrated awareness of the problems of
employee fertility and fetal risk and the establishment of specific standards designed to guard against the risk, it is difficult to accept Johnson Controls' position that it must implement a policy repugnant to
Title VII to protect the next generation. The applicable OSHA standards, duly promulgated, accurately and objectively set forth an em-

295. See supra notes 256-64 and accompanying text.
296. See Occupational Safety and Health Standards: Lead, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 (1989).
297. § 1910.1025(j)(3)(C).
298. § 1910.1025()(3)(D)(ii)(A); § 1910.1025 app. A, at 170.
299. § 1910.1025()(3)(D)(ii)(F); § 1910.1025 app. B, at 173.
300. § 1910.1025 app. A, at 170; app. C, at 179-86.
301. § 1910.1025 app. A, at 170; app. B, at 179.
302. § 1910.1025 app. A, at 171; app. C, at 179.
303. § 1910.1025 app. C, at 179.
304. § 1910.1025 app. C, at 186; app. B, at 173..
305. § 1910.1025 app. C, at 185-86. The applicable standards assume that both male and
female reproductivity can be adversely affected by lead exposure. Id.
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ployer's responsibilities to employees exposed to lead. The interests of
fertile workers-women and men-and their offspring are protected by
adherence to these standards. The employer has no moral obligation to
engage in a course of action which is violative of Title VII when the
interests of parties it seeks to protect are protected already by compliance with OSHA regulations.
It is clear, however, that by eliminating fertile women from the
workplace, the employer can avoid or at least reduce its obligations
under OSHA. Because a rational employer is likely to prefer the elimination of fertile women from lead-handling jobs to the payment of tem0 6 an employer who
porary medical removal benefits, for example,
grounds a fetal vulnerability policy on concern for the worker and her
prospective fetus should be viewed with healthy suspicion.
D. Proper Application of the BFOQ Defense
The Seventh Circuit in Johnson Controls, after conducting a business necessity analysis also concluded in dicta that even under a BFOQ
0 1 However, because the court utidefense the employer could prevail.3
lized the framework set forth in Torres v. Wisconsin Department of
Health & Social Services,30 8 a test devised by the Seventh Circuit itself, it came to a result arguably different from that which would result
9
under Western Airlines, Inc. v. CriswelP where the employer's policy
3 10
was geared specifically to the safety of third parties. While the tests
of Torres"' and Criswell have nearly identical elements, the Seventh
306. Medical Surveillance Guidelines, § 19.10.1025 app. C, at 182 (1989) (An employer
who removes an employee because the employee's blood lead level is in excess of the level mandated by the regulation must maintain the employee's rate of pay and benefits and return the
employee to his or her former job when the employee's blood lead level returns to a level deemed
safe by the regulation.).
307. 886 F.2d at 893.
308. 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1133 (interim ed.
1989). Torres itself has an interesting history. In Torres, male correctional officers at a women's
prison brought suit alleging that they were as capable as women guards in carrying out the rehabilitative goals of the prison. Id. at 1524. The employer had implemented a policy of staffing
certain positions in the living units only with women. Id. at 1525. Originally, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the judgment of the district court that prison officials had failed to establish that sex was
a BFOQ for a women's maximum security prison. 838 F.2d 944 (7th Cir. 1988), reh'g granted,
859 F.2d 1523, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1133 (interim ed. 1989). The court however granted
rehearing en banc and ultimately reversed the district court on the theory that the defendants
were required to meet an unrealistic and unfair burden when they were faulted for failure to
produce objective evidence validating their theory that rehabilitation of female prisoners is hindered by the use of male guards. 859 F.2d at 1532.
309. 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
310. In Torres the third party interest recognized by the Seventh Circuit was female felons
(clients) for rehabilitation. 859 F.2d at 1532, 1533.
311. The Torres test requires the employer to demonstrate that the BFOQ is reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the employer's business and that he had reasonable cause to
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Circuit, in applying Torres, lessened the burden imposed on the employer to provide evidence to support its contention that all or nearly all
women would be unable to perform the job safely and efficiently. Only
with this lessened burden could the employer prevail.
1. Criswell: The Appropriate Standard
In CriswelP12 the Supreme Court adopted a test for establishing a
BFOQ defense for age discrimination allegedly justified on the basis of
customer safety.3 13 Because the language of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 31 4 under which the Criswell action was
brought, is identical to and borrowed from Title VII, s1 5 the Court's
interpretation of the BFOQ language in Criswell is applicable also to
actions under Title VII. s1 6
To qualify as a BFOQ under Criswell, the employer must demonstrate (1) that the job qualification which is invoked to justify discrimination is " 'reasonably necessary to the essence of his business,' "317
and (2) "'that he had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual
basis for believing, that all or substantially all [affected employees]
would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job
involved.' "18 If the employer cannot meet his burden of establishing
that all or substantially all employees would be unable to perform
safely, he may in the alternative establish that age is a "legitimate
proxy for the safety-related job qualifications by proving that it is 'impossible or highly impractical' to deal with the [affected] employees on
an individualized basis."3 9
The Court in Criswell specifically rejected a reasonableness standard urged by the employer,3 20 saying that a reasonableness standard is
"plainly at odds with Congress' decision . . .to subject such management decisions to a test of objective justification in a court of law." 321

believe that all or substantially all persons of one sex are unable to safely and efficiently perform
the duties of the job. Id. at. 1527, 1530. Cf. supra notes 124-127 and accompanying text.
312. 472 U.S. at 400.
313. See supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
314. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988).
315. 472 U.S. at 412.
316. The Court in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) noted the similarities between ADEA and Title VII. The Criswell Court borrowed a Title VII interpretation for resolution
of the ADEA claim. Since the Criswell holding was based on Title VII doctrine, it ought to apply
also to Title VII claims.
317. 472 U.S. at 413 (quoting Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236 (5th
Cir. 1976)).
318. Id. at 414 (quoting Usery, 531 F.2d at 235).
319. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Usery. 531 F.2d at 236).
320. Id. at 419.
321. Id. (quoting Petitioner's brief at 30).
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In Criswell the airline argued that the jury should have been instructed
to defer to the airline's selection of job qualifications that were " 'reasonable in light of the safety risks.' ",322 The Court said that the BFOQ
standard adopted by ADEA is one of "reasonable necessity" rather
than the lower standard of "reasonableness. '"323
In contrast to the Criswell standard, the Torres standard is one of
reasonableness. In fact, the Torres court appears to have adopted a
"good faith" standard for employers where there is limited scientific.
evidence supporting the employer's theory linking the employer's policy
to the result sought to be achieved. 2 The result in Torres is that, absent evidence to the contrary, any reasonable employer theory linking
the exclusionary policy to a specific desired objective growing out of the
essence of the business is sufficient to meet the second prong of the
Torres test. This standard is clearly at odds with Criswell.
2. Application of the Reasonable Necessity Standard to Pregnant
Women
The court in Johnson Controls, in its application of the Torres
elements of the BFOQ defense, was required to determine whether the
fetal protection policy was "reasonably necessary" to the employer's
legitimate interest in industrial safety. This finding would determine
whether Johnson Controls had reasonable cause to believe that all or
substantially all fertile women " would be unable to perform "safely
It is at this point
and efficiently ' 26 the duties of the job involved.
that the Seventh Circuit's departure from the Criswell standard becomes evident. Assuming, arguendo, that fetal safety is essential to the
business of Johnson Controls, its exclusion of all fertile women from
lead-handling jobs, is not "reasonably necessary" to industrial safety
under Criswell. First, assuming that Johnson Controls' concern is appropriately focused upon the safety of the fetus, 8 it is highly unlikely
that all or substantially all women will become pregnant and thus, ar-

322. Id.
323. Id.
324. In Torres, the court noted that even the plaintiff's own witness testified that there is
"little scholarship in the area of rehabilitation of the female felon." 859 F.2d at 1532.
325. The fetal vulnerability policy applies only to women "with childbearing capacity." 886
F.2d at 876.
326. This language was taken from Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (quoting Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1968)).
327. 886 F.2d at 897.
328. Johnson Controls argued that its purpose in implementing its fetal protection policy
was to protect both pregnant women and their unborn children. Id. at 876. Presumably, all workers should be protected by the employer's adherence to the OSHA standards governing lead.
Therefore, the more tenable argument is that the fetal protection policy is designed to protect only
the unborn children of pregnant employees.
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guably, unable to perform their jobs safely and efficiently. The employer presented no evidence on fertility rates of Johnson Controls' employees but the court endorsed the employer's tacit assumption that
substantially all fertile women during the tenure of their employment
in the battery division would conceive and carry a child. s29 Such an
assumption, while marginally reasonable, does not meet the Criswell
standard. s30 Lumping all women into one category and assuming that
all will conceive a child violates the standard set forth by Criswell. Furthermore it is inconsistent with the requirement under Title VII that
each employee be treated as an individual and not as a member of a
class. " 1 Even though the majority of women may become pregnant, an
employer is prohibited by Title VII from implementing a policy that
would in effect penalize women who do not conceive. "Even a true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an
individual to whom the generalization does not apply." 3 2 Because the
employer in Johnson Controls presented no evidence to suggest that all
or substantially all fertile women in the battery division would conceive
and carry a child, the court should not have concluded that the fetal
protection policy was reasonably necessary to achieve the goal of industrial safety. The Seventh Circuit's emphasis on the problems created
for women by lead exposure ss is ineffective because it assumes the fact
it must establish-that substantially all fertile women will conceive.
Further, the evidence presented by Johnson Controls, and noted approvingly by the court, on the desirability of being cautious in light of
the conservative trend in lead exposure standards"' also skirts the real
issue by assuming the fact in controversy. Needed was objective evidence that all or substantially all fertile women will become pregnant
and thus create the risk that the employer's fetal protection policy
seeks to avoid. No such evidence was offered.
329. The Department of Labor, at the time the PDA was being considered, assumed "a
birth rate of 66.7 births per 1,000 women 15 to 44 years of age" per year. H.R. REP. No. 948,
95th Cong., 2d Sess., 9, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4749, 4757. Without supporting statistics to the contrary (none were provided by Johnson Controls), and assuming
that all fourteen employees in the battery division are fertile women, see 886-F.2d at 975 n.4, the
employees should produce just short of one child per year. In the meantime, thirteen of the fourteen women who will not be pregnant have been denied the opportunity to work in the battery
division.
330. In Criswell, the Court rejected the airline's argument that flight engineers (who as a
group were easily distinguishable from pilots) must meet the same stringent qualifications as pilots
and that it was logical to extend to flight engineers the age-60 requirement imposed by the FAA
on pilots. 472 U.S. at 418.
331. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708-09 (1978).
332. Id. at 708.
333. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 898.
334. Id. at 899.
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The court in Johnson Controls, had no reason to conduct further
analysis because it concluded that the fetal protection policy was reasonably necessary under the reasonableness standard it embraced.
Under the Criswell standard of reasonable necessity, however, the employer, in lieu of demonstrating that all or substantially all fertile
women will conceive, may establish that sex is a proxy for the desired
classification-all women who conceive-by proving that it is impossible or highly impractical to deal with each woman on an individual
basis. 3 The question that should have been addressed by the Johnson
Controls court was whether it was possible for Johnson Controls to
identify fertile women who had conceived and to remove them from
lead-handling jobs at such time as their pregnancies are documented.
Today a pregnancy can be detected within days after implantation
of the egg in the lining of the uterus."3 6 After the egg is implanted,
ordinarily within one week after fertilization, the tissue between the
egg and the uterus (the chorion) produces the lormone human chorionic gonadotropin (HCG) which is excreted into the mother's urine
and blood.33 ' Non-intrusive rapid test pregnancy screening using the
mother's urine as the testing medium registers the presence of HCG
with high levels of accuracy, ordinarily in excess of ninety-five per
cent." By using blood as the testing medium, the reliability of the test
is much higher.33 ' The availability of this safe, accurate, and inexpensive procedure calls into question the Johnson Controls court's conclusion that "the magnitude of medical difficulties in detecting and diagnosing early pregnancy" justifies the extension of the fetal protection
policy to all fertile women.3 40 With a workplace testing program for all
fertile women who wish to remain eligible for lead-handling jobs, the
employer might well be satisfied that only non-pregnant women would
be working in positions carrying a substantial risk of harm to the unborn child."" With a mandatory pregnancy testing program in place,

335.
336.

See supra text accompanying note 323.
See COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF

PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS, supra

note 265, at

166.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. 886 F.2d at 898.
341. Urine or blood testing would appear to be a greater invasion of a woman's privacy
than, for example, wearing a badge to detect ionizing radiation, but such testing likely can withstand a privacy challenge. First, a blood or urine test "search" does not implicate the Fourth
Amendment where the search and seizure is conducted by a private party unless the private party
is acting as a government agent. Skinner v. Railway Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1411
(interim ed. 1989). But see Semore v. Pool, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1087, 1094, 266 Cal. Rptr. 280, 282
(1990) (right of privacy in the California constitution protects Californians from actions of private
employers as well as government agencies). Second, the employer likely can demonstrate that
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the employer would be unable to demonstrate that it was impossible or
highly impractical to identify individual employees who are pregnant
and then to remove them, temporarily, from high lead-exposure jobs.
3. Application of the Reasonable Necessity Standard to Fertile
Women
Women who have not yet conceived but who will conceive while
holding a job involving lead exposure constitute a second group affected
by the fetal protection policy. This. group presents a different problem
because reduction of blood lead levels following removal from a lead
exposure area may require a significant length of time that frequently
extends well into the pregnancy term."4 2 If a woman discovered her
pregnancy immediately after conception and immediately transferred
out of a high lead-exposure job, the fetus within her womb might continue to be affected to an unknown extent for a period of time which
may vary with a number of factors. " ' It is concern about this potential
risk of unknown proportions and indeterminate length which seems to
be at the heart of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Johnson Controls.
Under Criswell, the employer is required to demonstrate that all
or substantially all women who conceive while working in lead handling
jobs will be affected by lead sufficient to injure their unborn children. 4 4
This Johnson Controls was unable to do. 4 5 In the alternative, under
Criswell, the employer is permitted to assert that sex is a legitimate
proxy for the safety-related job classification because it is impossible to
deal with employees on an individualized basis.' 6 Thus, Johnson Controls could assert that- it needed to exclude all fertile women because it
could not identify which fertile women will be injured and pass the
injury along to the unborn child. If however, one assumes that the
OSHA standards governing lead are adequate to guard against injury

safety considerations justify intrusive testing of certain categories of employers without individualized suspicion. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1421; see also National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1396 (interim ed. 1989) (compelling interest in public safety outweighs privacy expectation of employees).
342. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 878.
343. Id. at 882 There is disagreement among experts on this point. See supra note 36.
344. 472 U.S. at 414.
345. See 886 F.2d at 877. Johnson Controls' medical consultant admitted that only one
child born to a mother employed in a lead-handling job allegedly suffered an adverse effect; the
child was hyperactive. Id. A California court of appeals examining the same fetal protection policy also concluded Johnson Controls had failed to meet its burden. See Johnson Control's, Inc., v.
California Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 218 Cal. App. 3d 517, 543, 267 Cal. Rptr. 158,
171 (1990) (the mere possibility of harm to offspring falls short of a showing that "all or substantially all" female workers create such a risk).
346. 472 U.S. at 414.

Published by eCommons, 1989

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 15:2

to the mother and father 8 7 the employer's argument under the alternative to the second Criswell prong fails. Only by assuming that the applicable OSHA standards do not protect the fertile woman can an employer assert that unknown dangers to the mother will result in injury
to the unborn child. For the court in Johnson Controls to approve the
employer's argument is thus the equivalent of judicial notice that
OSHA's regulations governing lead are incorrect and that the employer
must take extraordinary measures.848 This ruling places the court in the
position of second-guessing OSHA on scientific matters, a position it
should avoid.
E.

Likely Result of Refusal to Uphold a Fetal Protection Policy

The Seventh Circuit in Johnson Controls based its approval of the
fetal protection policy on two policy grounds: (1) the employer should
be protected from tort liability arising from injury to the unborn child
separate from any injury to the mother,3 ' 9 and (2) society has an interest in protecting the well-being of unborn children.35 0 The Seventh Cir-

cuit thus indirectly expressed its belief that, in the absence of a fetal
protection policy, economic injury would befall the employer as a result
of tort judgments and that the interests of the unborn child would be
unprotected. Neither of these results will occur.
First. if the employer complies with all applicable OSHA standards governing lead, injury to unborn children is unlikely to occur.
Second, assuming that an unborn child may have been injured in utero,
the employee may not have a duty to the child if the child was injured
prior to viability. Third, assuming that an employer has a duty, an employer who acts reasonably is unlikely to breach his duty. Fourth, assuming that the employer's actions were unreasonable, it is unlikely
that the cost of any tort judgement will be borne by the employer.
1. The Employer Does Not Need Protection from Tort Liability
Recent
demonstrate
viability are
v. Wade15 1

Supreme Court decisions in the area
that under the Constitution the rights
subordinate to the rights of the woman
the Court said that the word person

of abortion rights
of a fetus prior to
carrying it. In Roe
in the fourteenth

347. See supra notes 300-06 and accompanying text.
348. See 886 F.2d at 917 ("my colleagues essentially take judicial notice that OSHA is
wrong . . an extraordinary step") (Easterbrook, J.,dissenting).
349. 886 F.2d at 884 n.25. The court stated: "Although costs from tort judgments are
merely a secondary consideration, they are still an important and legitimate additional consideration for an employer when lead safety policies may very well affect the development of the child in
its most critical stage in the mother's womb." Id.
350. Id. at 897-98.
351. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol15/iss2/5

1990]

TITLE VII BUSINESS NECESSITY DEFENSE

amendment "has application only postnatally,"3 62 but that the state has.
a compelling interest in protecting the life of the fetus at the point of
viability.883 Prior to viability, decisions about the unborn child are
within the purview of the mother and her doctor. 8" While the Court in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services3 55 criticized the, "rigid trimester analysis" 851 of Roe v. Wade, the Court stopped short of disman-

tling the distinction between viability and non-viability. 57 Thus, currently, until the fetus reaches the point of viability, it has no protection
under the Constitution.
An employer may have a common law duty to an unborn child of
an employee but the duty may depend upon whether the unborn child
was viable or non-viable when the injury or death occurred. In Michigan, for example, in which Johnson Controls' Owosso plant is lo-

cated,8"8 three recent cases have addressed an employer's duty to an

unborn child. In Jarvis v. Providence Hospitals 9 the court held that
the parents of an unborn child viable at the time of death in utero have
a cause of action under the state's wrongful death statute against the
mother's employer even though the fetus was not viable at the time of
the employer's tortious conduct.86 0 The mother was employed by the,
defendant hospital in a laboratory where she contracted hepatitis after
cutting herself on a vial containing bilirubin control substance."' 1 After
reporting the accident, she was not given an injection of gamma globulin to combat hepatitis. 6 " At the time of her injury she was three and
one-half months pregnant."' Even though her unborn child was not
viable at the time of the defendant's conduct, 3 " the court held that the
employer owed a duty of care to the unborn child independent of its
duty to the mother because the defendant knew 'the mother was pregnant and injury to the child resulting from hepatitis was foreseeable.36 5

352. Id. at 157.
353. Id. at 163.
354. Id.; see also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 389 (1979).
355. 109. S. Ct.'3040 (interim ed. 1989).
356. Id. at 3044.
357. Id. at 3057. The Court stated: "we do not see why the State's interest in protecting
potential human life should come into existence only at the point of viability, and that there
should therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting it before
viability." Id.
358. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 309, 310 (E.D. Wis. 1988), aff'd, 886
F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (interim ed. 1990).
359. 178 Mich. App. 586, 444 N.W.2d 236 (1989).
360. Id. at 588, 444 N.W.2d at 237.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 590, 444 N.W.2d at 238.
365. Id. at 595, 444 N.W.2d at 240.
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In addition to liability under the Michigan wrongful death statute,
a Michigan employer may also be liable for injuries sustained by the
unborn child of an employee if the child is subsequently born alive. In
Womack v. Buckhorn,W-" the Michigan Supreme Court, relying on the
reasoning of a New Jersey case3 67 established the principle that a child
has a "'legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body.'

"368

The

principle of Womack is ostensibly extended by Monusko v. Postle,6 9 a
non-employment case, where the court held that a child has a cause of
action against her mother's doctor for failure to test the mother for
rubella even though the child had not yet been conceived at the time of
the doctor's actions.370 Calling the action a preconception tort, 71 the
court based the doctor's duty on the foreseeability of injury to the child
resulting, from failure to test and, if necessary, immunize the mother
against rubella. 7 Ostensibly, an employer would be liable for injuries
sustained by the unborn child of an employee resulting from the employer's tortious conduct if the injury to the child was foreseeable.
Recently in Fryover v. Forbes373 the Michigan Supreme Court
halted the expansion of tort liability for death of an unborn child when
it held that the state's wrongful death act did not "create a cause of
action for a nonviable fetus not born alive." 7' The decedent in Fryover
had swerved her vehicle in an attempt to avoid hitting a dog owned by
the defendant, resulting in the deaths of both the mother and the sixteen-week-old fetus. 7 5
The question of whether an employer has a. duty to an unborn
child injured or killed prior to viability is thus a complex one. Additionally, because any injury to a fetus from exposure to lead may occur
before conception or very early in the pregnancy, and thus well before
viability, it is by no means certain that the employer has a duty to an
unborn child arguably injured as a result of exposure to lead.
An employer is not in need of protection from tort liability for the
second reason that an employer who acts reasonably is unlikely to

366.
367.
368.

384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971).
Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
384 Mich. at 725, 187 N.W.2d at 222 (quoting Smith, 31 N.J. at 364, 157 A.2d at

503).
369. 175 Mich. App. 269, 437 N.W.2d 367 (1989).
370. Id. at 276, 437 N.W.2d at 370.
371. Id. at 271, 437 N.W.2d at 367-68.
372. Id. at 275-76, 437 N.W.2d at 369-70.
373. 433 Mich. 8.78, 446 N.W.2d 292 (1989).
374. Id. at 878, 446 N.W.2d at 292.
375. Fryover v. Forbes, 176 Mich. App. 36, 37, 439 N.W.2d 284, 284, rev'd, 433 Mich.
878, 446 N.W.2d 292 (1989). The trial court had granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment; the court of appeals reversed. Id.
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breach any statutory or common law duty to the unborn child of an
employee. Jarvis3 71 is illustrative. There, the employer, a medical laboratory, failed to follow its own procedure by refusing to administer to
the child's mother a gamma globulin injection.3 77 Further, the mother's

supervisor told her not to be concerned about the cut in spite of a manufacturer's warning indicating that the substance in the vial could
transmit hepatitis. 8 ' The hospital-employer in Jarvis was hardly
innocent.
In contrast, an employer who acts reasonably in addressing the
issue of workplace exposure to toxic substances is unlikely to breach
any duty to unborn children of workers of either sex. Diligence in the
collection and dissemination of information is key to the responsible
exercise of the employer's duty. 8

9

The employer would appear to

strengthen his position by: (1) implementing longitudinal studies on the
effects of certain substances on fertile employees and their children, (2)
disseminating regularly to employees all pertinent information on the
toxic substance in question, including risks to the employee and her or
his offspring, (3) conveying all information to employees in language
that can be understood by a non-scientist, (4) making available to employees information about alternative employment opportunities within
the company to enhance employee decision-making, and (5) encouraging employees to ask questions to better ensure that each employee has
all the information needed to make a decision that is appropriate for
him or her and any subsequent children. Ultimately, the fully-informed
employee is in the best position to determine the appropriateness of a
higher-paying but riskier job.
Even if an employer is found to have breached his duty toward the
unborn child, it is unlikely that the costs will be borne by the employer
alone. In some cases, the costs may be covered by worker's compensation. In Bell v. Macy's California380 the court held that even though
the injuries to the employee's unborn child were a direct result of workrelated negligence towards the mother,"' the injuries were within the

376. 178 Mich. App. 586, 444 N.W.2d 236.
377. Id. at 589, 444 N.W.2d at 237.
378. Id. at 590, 444 N.W.2d at 238.
379. It is assumed that-the reasonable employer complies with all appropriate OSHA standards pursuant to its specific duty under 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (1988). Johnson Controls already
had many worker protection programs in place and, arguably, was acting responsibly. See 886
F.2d at 875-76.
380. 212 Cal. App. 3d 1442, 261 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1989).
381. The mother, seven months pregnant, suffered abdominal pains and sought the assis-

tance of the store nurse. The nurse delayed getting the mother to a hospital. During the delay the
uterus ruptured and the baby was born with severe brain damage and other injury. Id. at 1446-47,
261 Cal. Rptr. 449-50.
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conditions of compensation of the mother and thus worker's compensa38 2 In other cases, injury to an untion provided the exclusive remedy.
383 Either
born child would be covered by the employer's liability policy.
way, the costs associated with employer liability will be shared by society or other employers.
2. The Interests of Unborn Children Are Sufficiently Protected by
OSHA Regulations
3 84
As the foregoing discussion indicates the employer's observance
of all applicable OSHA standards governing lead should be sufficient to
protect the interests of unborn children. This is not to say that, under
OSHA standards, no harm will befall any of the offspring of Johnson
Controls' employees. Instead, the standards incorporate the dual interests of the employee in a safe workplace and the employer in being able
to conduct economically viable operations. It is possible that, under
current standards, some employees or their offspring may suffer injury
as a result of lead exposure. The standards are designed to tolerate an
acceptable level of risk;185 the precise level of risk is left to the determination of those who have the required scientific expertise.
The safety net in the OSHA system is the employee herself. Some
employees may be unwilling to tolerate the risk deemed acceptable by
the regulators and may choose to leave a job, perhaps only temporarily,
in the presence of any risk, however small. The OSHA regulations governing lead take cognizance of the employee's ability to pursue a course
86 In contrast, the court in
of action conducive to family planning
of
Johnson Controls assumes that a woman is likely to run the risk
87
harmed.
be
not
would
child
her
that
lead exposure in the hope
In light of carefully promulgated OSHA standards coupled with
employee decision-making based on full information, the employer's position in Johnson Controls-that precluding fertile women from leadhandling jobs is reasonably necessary to industrial safety-is not
tenable.

382. Id. at 1455, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 455-56.
383. See id. at 1458, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 457 (White, J.,dissenting).
384. See supra notes 296-306 and accompanying text.
385. Judge Easterbrook in his dissent in Johnson Controls emphasized that zero is not the
only acceptable level of risk. 886 F.2d at 919.
386. See, e.g., Occupational Health and Safety Standards: Lead, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025
app. A (1989) (employees advised to notify employer of desire for medical advice regarding reproductive activity, to wear respirator when children are desired, and to protect reproductive capacity
through medical surveillance).
387. 886 F.2d at 897 ("[Ilt would not be improbable that a female employee might somehow rationally discount this clear risk in her hope and belief that her infant would not be adversely affected from lead exposure.").
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V.

CONCLUSION

There is a growing body of case and statutory law which has conferred upon the fetus rights independent of the pregnant woman who
carries it.388 One commentator has noted that "[c]onceptualizing the
fetus as an entity with legal rights . . .has made possible the future
creation of fetal rights that could be used against the pregnant woman."3 8" Without expressing any intention to do so, the UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. court used the barely-recognized right of the fetus to
healthy development to subvert the mother's right to equal employment
opportunity under Title VII. If estimates of the number of women engaged in jobs that present the risk of harm to the fetus 90° are correct,
literally millions of women may be affected by employer policies that
prevent women from working at jobs which may harm unborn children.
Further, it appears that society's awareness of workplace hazards is in-

creasing.8 91 Substances and processes today recognized as dangerous
were paid no heed only twenty years ago. 8" Workplace processes today
considered safe may in the twenty-first century be deemed hazardous
or at least less safe than originally thought. As a result the estimate of
twenty million women workers potentially affected could be too low.
Johnson Controls has a general duty to conduct its workplace
practices in accordance with federal and state regulations but has no
legal obligation to go beyond what OSHA requires for the creation of a
safe workplace." The only general duty regarding safety imposed on
an employer comes from the general duty clause of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act. 3 " The statute, on its face, refers only to the
general duty owed by the employer to the employee.3 95 To date, no

388. See Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hosp., 139 Vt. 138, 142, 425 A.2d 92, 94 (1980)
("'A viable unborn child, is in fact, biologically speaking, a presently existing person and a living
human being .... ') (quoting White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 536, 458 P.2d 617, 622 (1969)).
389. Johnson, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's ConstitutionalRights
to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 614 (1986).
390. The EEOC estimates that 20 million jobs involve exposure to reproductive hazards. 45
Fed. Reg. 7514 (1980).
391. See Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1988).
392. The Occupational Safety and Health Act, which regulates hazardous and unsafe workplace practices, is itself only twenty years old. See id.
393. The federal system of promulgating workplace regulations which involves the publication of proposed rules followed by a public comment period seems better able to accommodate the
interests of all appropriate parties than ad hoc actions taken by employers who may or may not
have sufficient information on technical and medical issues of enormous complexity.
394. See 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1988) which provides: "(a) Each employer-(l) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees . ... "

395.

Id.

Published by eCommons, 1989

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 15:2

court has construed the general duty clause to include a duty to the
unborn children of employees."9 6 Johnson Controls does, however, have

an explicit legal obligation under Title VII to refrain from making
workplace decisions based upon sex. Johnson Controls' volunteerism
here is misplaced and removes from the woman a decision that she is
capable of making for herself and for any children she may choose to
bear.
Because Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy affects only

women, it is on its face non-neutral and must be justified if at all as a
BFOQ. Under a BFOQ analysis the interests of only the worker herself
should be taken into account. The primary focus of the analysis should
be on whether the employee can do her job, not whether the fetus will

be injured. Title VII contains no reference to the interests of unborn
children. In addition, the interpretation of Title VII to include the interests of consumers should not be further extended to embrace the

interests of unborn children because unborn children are clearly distin-

guishable from customers. Last, the interests of the fetus are adequately protected by OSHA regulations governing lead.
Under the standard set forth in Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell,
an employer who implements a policy affecting fertile and pregnant
women is required to demonstrate that all or substantially all women

will become pregnant, suffer injury to their reproductive systems, and
pass the injury along to their unborn children. In the alternative the

employer must demonstrate that it is impossible or highly impractical
to identify only those who will become pregnant or be injured. Johnson
Controls could demonstrate neither. First, the employer could not
demonstrate that all fertile employees would become pregnant. Second,
the employer could not demonstrate that all pregnant women would

suffer injury and pass it along to their offspring. While an employer
can assert that it is difficult to determine which if any woman will be
injured reproductively, in the presence of uncertainty it is more rational
396. In a case both interesting and disturbing, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that an employer's fetal protection policy did not constitute a "hazard"
under OSHA's general duty clause. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. American
Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The employer's policy gave fertile women
working at a plant where lead levels were said to be unsafe for women of childbearing age the
choice of sterilization or transfer to other, lower paying jobs. Id. at 446. Five women underwent
sterilization. Id. OSHA issued a citation alleging that the fetal protection policy was a hazard
within the general duty clause. Id. at 447. The D.C. Circuit disagreed and, in the process, put its
stamp of approval on American Cyanamid's decision to preclude fertile women from lead-handling jobs. Further, in dicta, the court stated that the employer could not have been charged under
the Act if it had shut down its organic pigments department in order to comply with the applicable standard-30 micrograms of lead per 100 grams of whole blood. Id. 446. While the court said
that the employer had to "protect fetuses" it is clear that the court adopted the OSHA general
standard for lead. Id. The employer's duty, therefore, was to the employee rather than the fetus.
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to defer to the judgment of OSHA regulators who have established
lead exposure standards with the interests of all fertile workers and
their offspring in mind.
In the event that the unborn child of a worker is injured, the employer is unlikely to bear the costs of any judgment: the employer may
simply, have no duty to a fetus injured prior to viability, reasonable
conduct on the part of the employer is likely to preclude the possibility
of breach, and any damages incurred may be covered by insurance or
worker's compensation.
A fetal protection policy is an anathema to the letter and spirit of
Title VII, is unnecessary in light of OSHA, and is designed to protect
against employer liability that is unlikely to materialize. Furthermore,
it presumes that employers must protect the interests of potential offspring of employees. For all these reasons the most narrow defense is
appropriate.
Joanne Jocha Ervin
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